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The Malleability of Developmental Trends in Neutral and Negative
Memory Illusions
Henry Otgaar and Mark L. Howe
Maastricht University and City University London
Nathalie Brackmann and Tom Smeets
Maastricht University
Among many legal professionals and memory researchers there exists the assumption that susceptibility
to false memory decreases with age. In 4 misinformation experiments, we show that under conditions that
focus on the meaning of experiences, children are not always the most susceptible to suggestion-induced
false memories. We begin by presenting a short overview of previous developmental false memory
studies, the majority of which have found that the susceptibility to misinformation decreases with age.
In Experiment 1, 6/7-year-olds, 11/12-year-olds, and adults received a video and were confronted with
misinformation about related but nonpresented details. Older children and adults had higher misinfor-
mation acceptance rates than younger children. In Experiment 2, we replicated this finding adding a
younger child group (4/6-year-olds). In Experiments 3 and 4, we used new material and again found that
susceptibility to misinformation increased with age. Together, these experiments show that children’s
memory accuracy is not necessarily inferior to that of adults.’
Keywords: false memory, memory development, suggestion, misinformation, developmental reversal
In most child development textbooks, readers find that older
children typically outperform younger children on most if not
all tasks. This includes measures of learning, memory, reason-
ing, and complex problem solving. However, recently there
have been a number of counterintuitive developmental findings
reported in the literature, ones that show that younger children
outperform older children. For example, sometimes, younger
children generate more creative problem solutions than older
children (e.g., generate more alternative ways to use tools; see
Defeyter & German, 2003) or find it easier to learn certain
unusual abstract causal principals (see Gopnik, Griffiths, &
Lucas, 2015). In memory development, younger children can
sometimes be less susceptible to memory illusions than older
children and adults (Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008). Under
these conditions, younger children can be better eyewitnesses
than older children or adults.
These so-called developmental reversals mark an important excep-
tion to the standard textbook aphorisms. However, there is at least one
developmental aphorism that has remained despite these recently
reported reversals. Specifically, false memories induced by suggestion
tend to decline gradually between childhood and adulthood (Brainerd,
2013; Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Ceci & Bruck, 1993). This developmental
trend has been the focus of considerable research, not only because it
is of theoretical relevance when trying to understand memory changes
that occur with age, but also because it has important forensic impli-
cations. Specifically, the law is concerned with how children’s sus-
ceptibility to memory illusions makes them less reliable witnesses in
judicial proceedings. Indeed, oftentimes, legal professionals regard
children’s evidentiary statements as being less credible than adults’
(e.g., Bruer & Pozzulo, 2014a; Knutsson & Allwood, 2014) because
of children’s greater susceptibility to suggestion-induced memory
illusions.
The assumption that children are more susceptible to memory
illusions than adults is also shared among many memory research-
ers. For example, Sutherland and Hayne (2001, p. 388) observed
that, “the general finding is that suggestibility decreases as a
function of age.” Recently, McGuire, London, and Wright (2015,
p. 334) voiced a similar conclusion that “previous suggestibility
and misinformation studies [has indicated] that false memory
declines with age.” Such statements reinforce the long-held belief
that as children mature, suggestion- and misinformation-based
false memory rates decrease.
Over the past few decades, research has accumulated that shows
that another type of memory illusion, spontaneous false memories,
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exhibits the opposite developmental pattern. Spontaneous false
memories are ones that arise without any external pressure and
occur as a consequence of the activation of related information in
an individual’s knowledge base. Research has demonstrated that
these false memories increase significantly between childhood and
adulthood, a phenomenon that has been dubbed developmental
reversal (Brainerd, 2013). In the current studies, we assessed
whether the common developmental trend in suggestion-based
memory illusions can also be “reversed” such that younger chil-
dren are less susceptible to suggestion than older children and
adults. These experiments emerged from our speculation that the
standard developmental trend in suggestion-induced false memo-
ries can be attenuated or even reversed when applying theoretical
principles borrowed from research on the development of sponta-
neous false memories. Before presenting these experiments, we
provide a brief overview of developmental trajectories in both
spontaneous and suggestion-induced false memories.
Developmental Trends and False Memory Paradigms
Several paradigms include suggestive pressure in order to create
false memories. An often-used method is the misinformation para-
digm (Loftus, 2005), a procedure that has three stages: Participants
first witness an event (e.g., see a video of an unarmed theft), are then
presented with misinformation about the event (e.g., they are told that
the culprit carried a gun), and finally, participants receive a memory
test. What studies have shown is that about 30% of participants falsely
remember seeing the suggested detail (e.g., the gun) in the original
event. This result is known as the misinformation effect and it is more
pronounced in younger than older children and adults (Loftus, 2011;
Otgaar, Candel, Smeets, & Merckelbach, 2010).
Importantly, suggestive pressure and misinformation are not the
same. Misinformation usually involves the subsequent presentation of
(related) information that was not part of the original event. Sugges-
tive pressure can occur in a number of different forms, ranging from
the suggestion that an event occurred in a person’s life when in fact it
never did (memory implantation paradigm; e.g., see Otgaar et al.,
2012) to more subtle forms in which false memories are created when
eyewitnesses talk to each other and include false details about what
was witnessed (memory conformity paradigm; e.g., see Wright,
Memon, Skagerberg, & Gabbert, 2009).
The most frequent method used to induce spontaneous false
memories is the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm
(Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Here, participants
are presented with word lists containing associatively related
words (e.g., tears, sorrow, baby). The meanings of these words
converge on a nonpresented word known as the critical lure (i.e.,
cry). A robust finding is that the critical lure is often erroneously
remembered during recall or recognition tests (Brainerd et al.,
2008). Of relevance for the current studies is that these spontane-
ous false memories increase with age in childhood, a finding that
has intrigued researchers because the trend is the opposite of the
developmental decreases associated with suggestion-based mem-
ory illusions (Brainerd et al., 2008; Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest,
2002; Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; Otgaar,
Howe, Peters, Sauerland, & Raymaekers, 2013). This developmen-
tal reversal has not only been detected when using DRM lists but
also with other meaning-connected procedures such as when cat-
egorized materials or pictures are presented (e.g., Bruer & Poz-
zulo, 2014b; Howe, 2006, 2008; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004). When
considered together, these findings are somewhat perplexing be-
cause they suggest that young children are both more and less
susceptible to memory illusions than older children and adults.
To illustrate these different developmental patterns, we first
examined the available literature on age-related trends in
suggestion-induced false memories using the misinformation par-
adigm.1 We came across 29 articles in which findings were de-
scribed about the development of false memories using the classic
misinformation paradigm (see Table 1). As we anticipated, Figure
1a shows that the majority of these papers have found an age-
related decrease in susceptibility to misinformation, a pattern that
confirms ours as well as others’ (e.g., McGuire et al., 2015) view
about typical developmental trends in suggestion-induced false
memories. This contrasts nicely with Figure 1b that shows the
exact opposite developmental pattern for spontaneous false mem-
ories using the DRM paradigm (taken from Brainerd, Reyna, &
Zember, 2011).
Explaining Developmental Reversals in Spontaneous
False Memories
This developmental reversal effect is anticipated by a number of
theories. For example, Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT; Brainerd et al.,
2008) assumes that experiences are stored using two opposing
memory traces, verbatim and gist. Verbatim traces are involved in
the storage of item-specific, detailed surface characteristics of an
event whereas gist traces are related to the underlying meaning of
an event. In FTT, false memories occur when verbatim traces are
not available at retrieval and people rely on gist traces. Retrieved
information that is consistent with the underlying meaning of an
experience can be falsely recollected in the absence of contradic-
tory verbatim information. Because the ability to extract the gist of
experiences increases with age, and because it is not always
possible to use verbatim memories to suppress the output of false
memories, false memories tend to increase with age. Memory
research has confirmed that children have more difficulty extract-
ing gist from presented information and are poorer at generating
links between different parts of an experience than adults (Bjork-
lund, 1987, 2005; Esposito, 1975).
Another theory that accounts for this developmental reversal is
the Associative-activation Theory (AAT; Howe et al., 2009; Ot-
gaar et al., 2013). AAT is a theory that explains the development
1 The studies included in this review were identified using four search
engines (Web of Science, PubMed, ScienceDirect, and Google Scholar).
We looked for experimental papers that were written in English and
published after 1978. We chose this time frame because Ceci and Bruck
(1993) reported that only very few methodologically solid articles had been
published before 1978. The terms we used for the literature search were:
(children OR development) AND (suggestibility, misinformation, OR false
memories). We also had several inclusion/exclusion criteria. We only
included experiments that introduced misinformation (e.g., via suggestive
questions, visual, auditory, embedded narratives) following some sort of
witnessed event (classical misinformation paradigm). We did not include
articles using the false memory implantation paradigm (e.g., Otgaar et al.,
2010). Although these studies also introduce misinformation to partici-
pants, they follow a two-stage approach (misinformation and memory test)
instead of the classic three-stage misinformation procedure (event, misin-
formation, and memory test) that we used in the current experiments. Also,
we looked for articles that compared a minimum of two different age
groups with at least one of them being a child group.
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Table 1
Developmental Studies on the Misinformation Effect
Result
Study Age (years) Event
Form of
misinformation
Younger more
suggestible than
older
Younger less
suggestible than
older No difference
Cohen & Harnick
(1980)
9, 12, college
students
Video about petty crime Misleading questions x
King & Yuille (1987) 6, 9, 11, 16 Staged event Misleading questions x
Ceci, Ross, & Toglia
(1987), Exp. 1
3–12 Auditory story  slides
about a girl’s day at
school (no crime)
Misleading information x
Ornstein, Gordon, &
Larus (1992)
3, 6 Physical examination Misleading questions x
Oates & Shrimpton
(1991)
4–12 Blood collection,
interaction with
stranger
Misleading questions x
Marin, Holmes, Guth, &
Kovac (1979)
5–22 Staged event
(interaction between
experimenters, no
crime)
Misleading questions x (only one leading
question)
Duncan, Whitney, &
Kunen (1982), Exp. 2
7, 9, 11, college
students
Slides with short Star
Wars episodes
Misleading verbal
information
x
Flin, Boon, Knox, &
Bull (1992)
6, 10, adults Staged event (talk about
foot hygiene, no
crime)
Misleading questions x
Rudy & Goodman
(1991)
4, 7 Interaction with
stranger, watching
interaction (playing
board game)
Misleading questions x actions that
occurred
x overall
Saywitz, Goodman,
Nicholas, & Moan
(1991)
5, 7 Physical examination
(genital and
nongenital)
Misleading questions x
Perner & Wimmer
(1988)
2–4 Narrative about mother
interacting with
children (no crime)
Embedded in narrative
(only one item)
x
Ackil & Zaragoza
(1995)
7, 9, 11, college
students
Video about camp
experiences (no
crime)
Embedded in narrative x
Welch-Ross, Diecidue,
& Miller (1997)
3–5 Narrative about day of a
girl
Misleading questions x (4 min delay) x (1 week delay)
Hünefeldt, Rossi-
Arnaud, & Furia
(2009)
4–7 Cartoon-video Misleading questions x
Hünefeldt, Lucidi, Furia,
& Rossi-Arnaud
(2008)
4–7 Cartoon-video Misleading questions x
Kulkovsky & Klemfuss
(2008)
2–5 Staged event baking
cookies
Misleading questions x
Bright-Paul, Jarrold, &
Wright (2008)
3–7 Slide show about theft Embedded in narrative x
Quas et al. (2007) 3, 5 Playing alone in
laboratory
Biased interviewer/
misleading questions
x (misleading
questions)
x (only in free
recall single
interview,
long delay)
Roebers, Howie, &
Beuscher (2007)
6–8 Video about treasure
hunt
Misleading questions x
Melinder, Endestad, &
Magnussen (2006)
3, 6 Video showing children
playing together
Misleading questions x
Roebers & Schneider
(2005)
6, 7, 8, adults Video about treasure
hunt
Misleading questions x
Roebers, Gelhaar, &
Schneider (2004)
5–10 Staged event, video or
slide show about visit
of magician
Misleading questions x
Alexander et al. (2002) 3–7 Vaccination Misleading questions x
(table continues)
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of different types of false memories based in part on correlated
developmental differences in knowledge base and automatic pro-
cessing. The core point of AAT is that false memories arise due to
spreading activation across meaning-connected information in
memory. Processing of a word or concept results in an immediate
and parallel spread of activation to related concept nodes in a
person’s knowledge base (mental lexicon; Anderson, 1983; Collins
& Loftus, 1975; Landauer & Dumais, 1997). During this spread of
activation, concepts activate related concepts some of which were
not experienced, leading to the production of false memories.
According to AAT, false memories increase with age because of
changes in the structure, content, and speed of access to informa-
tion in a child’s knowledge base. It is because of these changes that
the strength and automaticity of associative activation increases
with age, something which in turn catalyzes age-related increases
in false memories from childhood through to adulthood (Howe,
2005; Howe & Wilkinson, 2011; Otgaar, Candel, Scoboria, &
Merckelbach, 2010; Otgaar, Smeets, & Peters, 2012). False mem-
ories are more likely to develop as children mature because they
gain knowledge and experience through formal and informal learn-
ing opportunities as well as through exposure to an increasingly
complex array of experiences.
Creating Developmental Reversals in Suggestion-
Induced False Memories
In the current set of studies, we examined whether we could
systematically alter (attenuate or reverse) developmental trends in
suggestion-based false memories by using our understanding of
how spontaneous memory illusions arise from meaning-connected
memory information. Although spontaneous false memories are
chiefly the result of endogenous processes (e.g., relying on mean-
ing, spreading activation), suggestion-based false memories occur
because of endogenous and exogenous (e.g., social influences)
processes (also see Brainerd et al., 2008). The false memory
paradigms that are used to evoke suggestion-based false memories
do not contain the necessary ingredients that educe the age-related
increases in false memories seen in the DRM paradigm. This is
because these paradigms represent an amalgam of endogenous and
exogenous (e.g., suggestive pressure) manipulations whereas what
is needed is more of a focus on the endogenous (memory) pro-
Table 1 (continued)
Result
Study Age (years) Event
Form of
misinformation
Younger more
suggestible than
older
Younger less
suggestible than
older No difference
Gobbo, Mega, & Pipe
(2002), Exp. 1
3, 5 Participation,
observation or
narration about
playing with salt-
dough
Misleading questions x (immediate
interview)
x (interview 1
week later)
Roebers & Schneider
(2002)
6, 8, 10 Video about money
theft and treasure
hunt
Misleading questions x
Roebers, Bjorklund,
Schneider, & Cassel
(2002)
5, 7, 10, adults Video about theft of a
bike
Misleading questions x
Newcombe & Dour
(2001)
5, 6 Story accompanied by
pictures about pet
Embedded in narrative x
Templeton & Wilcox
(2000)
3, 4, 6, adults Video showing Sesame
Street
Embedded in narrative x (original test) x (modified test)
Otgaar, Candel, Smeets,
& Merckelbach
(2010)
4–5, 8–11 Instructed interaction
with a puppet
Erroneous feedback x (commission
error)
x (omission error)
Figure 1. Developmental studies on the misinformation effect (1a) and
the DRM false memory illusion (1b). 1a Note: Studies that had different
developmental results for different conditions were included several times
in the graph. 1b Note: These data have been reported in Brainerd et al.
(2011). DRM  Deese/Roediger-McDermott.
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cesses of this task (e.g., meaning, spreading activation). In fact,
such design changes should be relatively easy to implement. As
Brainerd and colleagues (2011, p. 376) suggests, “the standard
[misinformation] paradigm can readily be adjusted to fit the algo-
rithm by instantiating the meaning of objects/events that are sup-
plied to children as misinformation with many things that they
actually experience during the initial phase of such an experiment,
much like DRM lists.” So basically, during the initial phase of a
misinformation experiment, participants should receive stimuli
that are meaning connected. Following this, participants should be
presented with misinformation that preserves the underlying mean-
ing of the originally presented stimuli. The prediction is that this
adapted misinformation procedure will likely result in an attenu-
ated or even a reversed developmental trend like the one that is
commonly found for spontaneous false memories.
Surprisingly, few researchers have followed these specific ad-
justments a priori to test whether false memories induced by
suggestion using the misinformation paradigm can increase with
age in a manner similar to spontaneous false memories (Ceci,
Papierno, & Kulkofsky, 2007). Although certain studies (Connolly
& Price, 2006; Fazio & Marsh, 2008; Principe, Guiliano, & Root,
2008; Ross et al., 2006) have found developmental reversal effects
in other paradigms such as memory conformity, developmental
reversals for implanted false memories such as those elicited by
the misinformation are practically nonexistent. Considering that
these false memories are perhaps one of the most relevant memory
illusions in legal cases (Loftus, 2005), it is relevant to examine
developmental reversals in the misinformation paradigm. More
importantly, although some studies have found developmental
reversal effects in other paradigms, they did not specifically check
whether the presented stimuli contained related details and hence
catalyzed false memory production; something that we will do in
the present experiments (see below).
The Current Experiments
In the current set of four experiments, we focused on the
theoretical conditions necessary to alter developmental trends in
children’s and adults’ suggestion-based false memories. Specifi-
cally, based on the tenets of both AAT and FTT, we modified the
misinformation paradigm. Here, we presented participants with
newly developed, forensically relevant video stimuli depicting
events that contained meaning related details. We used videos
because they are rich in perceptual detail and are frequently used
in standard misinformation experiments (Loftus, 2005).
For Experiment 1, we constructed new videos that were based
on principles found in the DRM paradigm (i.e., FTT’s gist extrac-
tion or AAT’s associative relatedness). These videos were then
included in a misinformation paradigm and were presented to
6/7-year-olds, 11/12-year-olds, and adults. After the presentation
of these videos, participants received misinformation about the
videos and were then given a recognition task. In order to compare
our findings with the DRM paradigm, participants were also given
a standard DRM word list task. We conducted a second experiment
in which our goal was to replicate the findings from Experiment 1
with a younger age group of 4/6-year-olds. For Experiments 3 and
4, we constructed yet another new video showing that the effects
of Experiments 1 and 2 were not limited to the type of material
used. In all of these experiments, the basic prediction was that
when using meaning-connected stimuli, typical developmental
trends in suggestion-induced false memories will be attenuated or
even reversed.
Based on AAT and FTT, some specific predictions can be made
about when standard developmental trajectories in suggestion-
based false memories should become attenuated or reversed. For
example, both AAT and FTT predict that just like the develop-
mental reversals seen with DRM word lists, young children will be
less likely to grasp the underlying meaning of these meaning-
connected videos than older children and adults. Thus, when
misinformation is provided about critical, nonpresented details,
older children and adults will be more likely to accept this sug-
gested misinformation than younger children. So, based on both
AAT and FTT, our expectation was that when using meaning-
connected videos, we should see a developmental reversal such
that susceptibility to misinformation increases rather than de-
creases with age.
Interestingly, AAT also predicts additional circumstances under
which developmental trends in suggestion-based false memories
can become attenuated or reversed. In AAT, considerable weight is
placed on the link between false memories and theme nodes. So,
not only does spreading activation result in the activation of related
concepts in one’s knowledge base, but it also leads to the activa-
tion of theme nodes: nodes that are related to the subset of
concepts being activated (Arndt & Reder, 2003; Howe & Wilkin-
son, 2011; Otgaar et al., 2014). Theme nodes are part of associa-
tive memory networks and they too can give rise to false recol-
lections. The idea is that material (e.g., DRM word lists) that
activates fewer themes leads to more false memories than material
that converges on multiple themes. The reason is that material
containing fewer themes is more likely to activate that theme more
quickly than when there are multiple themes. Moreover, the over-
all activation of this single theme may be greater than that for
materials that have more themes because activation in this latter
case is more dispersed across the many different themes. The
consequence is that these higher levels of activation of a single
theme catalyze false memories.
One way to examine this claim is to explore the effects of
valence (i.e., neutral or negative) on developmental trends in false
memory. Because the events that children encounter in forensic
settings contain a number of important emotional elements, under-
standing how emotion modulates developmental patterns of (false)
memories is important if findings are to be generalized to the legal
field (also see Otgaar et al., 2013). If we look at the literature
surrounding the effects of emotion on memory, then many studies
have shown that emotional events boost memory performance
(e.g., Mather, 2007; Phelps, 2006). This is especially true when
these emotional events evoke arousal (and even stress), particu-
larly during encoding and consolidation (Smeets, Otgaar, Candel,
& Wolf, 2008). The main point here is that memory performance
changes when emotional events evoke arousal. One idea is that
arousal attracts attention to the evoking stimulus that in turn leads
to binding of memory features, enhancing subsequent memory
performance. It has also been shown that event valence (particu-
larly negative valence) affects memory because emotional mem-
ories consist of well-integrated and dense networks of interrelated
concepts (see, e.g., Talmi, 2013). In such a network, information is
more likely to spread in a fast and automatic manner leading to
better memory.
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Because emotional events frequently boost memory accuracy,
one would expect that this might also protect individuals from
forming false memories for arousing and negative events. Al-
though research concerning the relation between emotion and
memory in adults suggests that negative events are less likely to
foster false memories than neutral or positive events. (e.g., Corson
& Verrier, 2007; Storbeck & Clore, 2005), recent studies have
shown that negative stimuli can increase false memory rates over
neutral stimuli (e.g., Howe, 2007; Howe, Candel, Otgaar, Malone,
& Wimmer, 2010; Otgaar, Candel, & Merckelbach, 2008; Porter,
Spencer, & Birt, 2003) and that developmental reversals are pres-
ent for different emotionally charged materials (e.g., Howe et al.,
2010; Quas et al., 2015). In AAT, this is expected because negative
information converges on fewer theme nodes than neutral infor-
mation. In FTT, this is predicted because it is easier to extract the
gist of negative than neutral information (e.g., Brainerd, Holliday,
Reyna, Yang, & Toglia, 2010). Thus, higher false memory rates
are expected for negative than neutral materials. Although this is
true for spontaneous false memories, how emotion interacts with
developmental trends in suggestion-based false memories and
whether developmental reversals in suggestion-based false mem-
ories are modulated by emotionally laden events has not been
directly addressed. To investigate the influence of valence on false
memory, children and adults in our experiments were presented
with negative (as well as neutral stimuli).
Experiment 1
For Experiment 1, we began by conducting a pilot study to
develop new material. We presented participants with critical cue
words (e.g., pistol, mailbox) and they had to provide response
items related to these words. We used adult participants in this
pilot work because research has shown that even if we had used
material relevant specifically to children’s knowledge base, devel-
opmental patterns of false memory production are still quite robust
(e.g., Metzger et al., 2008). The response items produced by adults
were then used to construct two videos (i.e., a robbery and a
postman bringing mail) in which the critical items were not in-
cluded in the video.
For this pilot task, we developed a situational gist task where
participants had to provide as many related response items as they
could to each of a number of critical cue words in two different
contexts, a cafeteria robbery and a postman delivering mail. These
related response items were then used to develop two new videos.
There were 20 participants (mean age  21.50, SD  2.89; 10
male) who each received a booklet in which 12 critical cue words
were mentioned (e.g., pistol, money, glasses, mailbox). Impor-
tantly, for half of the critical cue words, it was stated that they had
to come up with related response items when thinking about a
robbery and for the other half of the items, they had to think about
a scene in which a postman is bringing mail. For example, the
exact instruction for the robbery scene was: “A cafeteria at a gym
club is being robbed by an armed man. Try to come up with as
many items (minimum of 5) that are related to this event.” They
were given for the entire task (for all cue words) 15 min in order
to generate as many related response items as they could.
The presentation order of the scenarios was counterbalanced
across participants. For each of these scenarios, we selected three
items to serve as central details for the video and three to serve as
peripheral details. So, in total, there were six central and six
peripheral items. Central items referred to details depicting the
thematic content of the video (i.e., the robbery) whereas peripheral
details were not specifically related to the theme of the video.
The participants produced many related response items (N 
449). For each of the critical items, we selected the five related
items that were produced most often by participants. For example,
for the central critical response word pistol in the robbery scene,
participants came up with many different details (e.g., bullet), but
most often mentioned were the following related items: perpetra-
tor, silver necklace, black jacket, hat, and black trousers. These
related items (but not the critical items were used as stimuli in the
situational gist task) were included in the video of the robbery.
These two new videos were presented to participants (6/7-year-
olds, 11/12-year-olds, adults) in a modified misinformation para-
digm. Our prediction was that when the misinformation was pre-
sented, older children and adults would be more likely to confuse
the misinformation with the presented items in the videos than the
younger children. Also, to compare our findings with the devel-
opmental trend in spontaneous false memories, we presented par-
ticipants with both neutral and negative DRM word lists.
Method
Participants. Eighty-five participants were included, with 23
6/7-year-olds (mean age 6.70, SD 0.56; 11 boys; range: 6–7),
30 11/12-year-olds (mean age 11.47, SD 0.63; 17 boys; range
11–12), and 32 adults (mean age  21.38, SD  3.53; 9 male;
range 18–33). A power analysis with a power of 0.80 and a small
to medium effect size (partial2  0.06) resulted in a sample size of
80. For the child groups, we received school and parent permission
to test 53 children (23  30). The remaining participants were
tested in the adult pool. We tested five extra participants in case
participants dropped out of the experiment, thus data collection
was terminated after testing 85 participants. Children received a
small gift and adults received a small financial reimbursement. All
children had parental consent and assented on the day of testing.
The study was approved by the standing ethical committee of the
Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience at Maastricht University.
Design. This experiment consisted of a 3 (Age: 6/7-year-olds
vs. 11/12-year-olds vs. adults) 2 (Misinformation: yes vs. no)
2 (Detail: central vs. peripheral)  2 (Valence: negative vs. neu-
tral) mixed design with the latter three factors being within-
participant variables.
Materials.
Videos. Two videos were constructed based on the findings
from the pilot experiment and that differed in emotional content.
One video was emotionally negative and was about a robbery in a
cafeteria in which a culprit enters the cafeteria and demands
money from the people at the cash desk. The other video was
neutral and showed a postman delivering mail and a man opening
the door to receive the mail. In each video, 30 items were pre-
sented that were associatively related to six critical items (three
central and three peripheral). Each video lasted for about 1 min and
10 s. During the videos, we ensured that all presented items were
unambiguously visible.
Misinformation. Misinformation was presented in the form of
an eyewitness account of the videos. This eyewitness account was
audiotaped and played back to the participants. A research assis-
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tant that was not involved in this experiment acted as the eyewit-
ness and was audiotaped when reading the account. The eyewit-
ness accounts (control vs. critical) were the same for each
participant. During the misinformation phase, the eyewitness men-
tioned six new critical items and 18 old items from the original
video that were related to the critical items (for each critical item,
three related items were presented from the original video). We
also made a control version in which an eyewitness only men-
tioned the 18 original items without the new critical items.
Recognition task for the videos. Our recognition task was also
audio taped and consisted of 48 correct items, 12 critical items, 12
nonpresented related items, and 48 nonpresented unrelated items.
The recognition task was presented at a 5-s rate per item. Re-
sponses were recorded by the experimenter.
DRM lists. Five neutral (bread, smoke, window, foot, sweet)
and five negative (murder, punishment, cry, death, pain) 10-word
DRM lists were used in this experiment. The effectiveness of these
lists in generating false memories has been demonstrated in pre-
vious studies (Howe et al., 2010; Otgaar & Candel, 2011; Otgaar
et al., 2012) and list items were chosen from the Dutch word
association norms (Van Loon-Vervoorn & Van Bekkum, 1991).
List items were presented in order of associative strength to the
nonpresented critical lure, from strongest to weakest. Using the
Celex lexical database (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Gulikers, 1995), it
was ensured that the mean word frequency of neutral and emo-
tional critical lures did not differ statistically, t(8)  0.22, ns.
Similarly, the mean backward associative strength between the
neutral list items and their critical lures and the mean backward
associative strength between the emotional list items and their
critical lures did not vary statistically, t(8)  1.69, ns.
Recognition task for the DRM lists. The recognition task for
the DRM lists consisted of a total of 78 words where there were 40
correct items, 10 critical lures, 10 nonpresented related items, and
18 nonpresented unrelated items. The recognition task was audio
taped and was presented at a 5-s rate per item.
Procedure. Children were tested individually in rooms at their
elementary school and adults were tested at the university. Partic-
ipants were informed that they were involved in a memory study
and then received either the videos (misinformation paradigm) or
the DRM lists first. Order of presentation of the stimuli was
counterbalanced within each task. Our methodology was similar to
the standard misinformation paradigm used in previous studies
(Loftus, 2005). During presentation, participants saw the two vid-
eos on a computer screen and were told to pay close attention to
them. After witnessing the videos, participants were given a non-
verbal filler task (playing Tetris) for 3 min. Then, participants
received audio taped misinformation about one of the videos and
heard an audio taped control version with no misinformation about
the other video. The order of the presentation of the misinforma-
tion and control tapes was also counterbalanced. Following expo-
sure to the misinformation and the control tapes, participants had
to perform a nonverbal filler task (playing Tetris) for 3 min. Next,
they received a recognition task in which they were asked to
recognize only those items that were presented in the videos. After
the recognition task, all participants had to rate the emotionality of
the videos on a 5-point Likert scale (1  very negative, 5  very
positive). This was done to examine whether participants had
noticed the valence of the videos. The negative video (M  2.68,
SD  0.90) received statistically lower ratings than the neutral
video (M  3.55, SD  0.75; F(1, 84)  52.25, p  .001, p2 
0.38) indicating that the valence manipulation was effective. For
the DRM word lists, participants received either the neutral lists
first or the negative lists first. After the DRM word lists, partici-
pants were involved in a nonverbal filler task (playing Tetris).
Then, participants were presented with the DRM recognition task.
Results
As is customary in developmental research on spontaneous false
memories, scores were corrected for possible response bias, a
correction that leads to purer measures of hits and false memory
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2007; Brainerd et al., 2008; Holliday, Brain-
erd, & Reyna, 2011). Specifically, scores of all experiments were
transformed using the following signal detection parameters: d=
(memory discrimination) and c (response bias; Snodgrass & Cor-
win, 1988).2 Higher d= values stand for high memory discrimina-
tion. Negative c values represent a liberal bias while positive c
values refer to a conservative bias. Furthermore, when we ana-
lyzed age effects with three groups in all of our experiments, we
used Bonferroni correction.
We begin by presenting the video data and then turn to the DRM
lists. Finally, we present the analyses concerning the relationship
between performance on the video task and performance on the
DRM task. All data (raw and transformed) are reported in Tables
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
Video task.
Hit rates.
Memory discrimination. We performed a 3 (Age: 6/7-year-
olds vs. 11/12-year-olds vs. adults)  2 (Misinformation: yes vs.
no)  2 (Detail: central vs. peripheral)  2 (Valence: negative vs.
neutral) mixed ANOVA on the d= hit rates. Our results yielded a
statistically significant age effect, F(2, 82)  3.83, p  .03, p2 
0.09. Post hoc tests revealed that adults had statistically higher d=
values than the older children (p  .03). All other comparisons
were not statistically significant. We also found a statistically
significant valence effect, F(1, 82)  22.59, p  .001, p2  0.22,
with the negative video having statistically higher d= values than
the neutral video. Furthermore, central details had higher d= values
than peripheral details, F(1, 82)  14.07, p  .001, p2  0.15. All
other effects were not significant, including those concerning the
misinformation manipulation (see Table 3).
Bias. Like the discrimination index, we found a statistically
significant Age effect, F(2, 78)  7.10, p  .001, p2  0.15, with
2 When we analyzed the data using the raw scores or used another
transformation (two-high threshold), our developmental reversal effects in
all experiments were still robust. Also, when transforming scores using d=
and c, an additional correction should be applied for values that are zero or
one as the formulae for getting d= and c values do not accept zero or one
values. As there is some controversy about which correction should be
used, we used the rule that the values should be adjusted slightly up (.0001)
for scores of zero or slightly below for scores of one (.9999; see Snodgrass
& Corwin, 1988; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). Of importance, using
another correction (e.g., .01) did not change our main developmental trends
in suggestion-based false memories. As DRM studies lead to robust levels
of true and false memory, our idea was that values of 1 or 0 represent a pure
signal of hit rates or rejections. Because the raw zero and one values have
first been corrected and then used to calculate d= and c values, the raw
means in the tables cannot be used to accurately get the d= and c values in
the other tables.
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post hoc comparisons showing that bias was most liberal in the
6/7-year-olds, but only statistically decreased for the 11/12-year-
olds (p  .001). A statistically significant valence effect also
emerged, F(1, 78)  15.24, p  .001, p2  0.16, with the neutral
video having more liberal bias scores than the negative video.
Furthermore, bias scores were more liberal for the peripheral than
central details, F(1, 78)  8.27, p  .005, p2  0.10 (Table 4).
False memory.
Memory discrimination. A similar series of statistical analy-
ses was performed on the corrected false memory scores (critical
items). First, the most important analysis pertained to whether
susceptibility to misinformation increased with age. We indeed
found evidence for this. Our analyses revealed a significant Va-
lence  Age  Misinformation interaction, F(2, 79)  8.26, p 
.001, p2  .17. Additional tests showed the following results. For
the negative video, there was a significant Age  Misinformation
interaction, F(2, 79) 3.83, p .03, p2 .09, with simple effects
showing that the susceptibility to misinformation (suggestion-
based) false memories increased significantly with age; see Table
2). That is, for both types of details, we found that adults (central:
M 4.99, SD 6.01; peripheral: M 6.30, SD 3.60) and older
children (central: M  2.35, SD  5.72; peripheral: M  6.39,
SD  2.96) had significantly higher d= values rates than younger
children (central: M  0.48, SD  2.66; peripheral: M  5.43,
SD  5.39; p  .05). The difference between 11/12-year-olds and
adults was not significant (p  1.00; Table 3).
For the neutral video, we also found a significant Age 
Misinformation interaction, F(2, 79)  3.18, p  .047, p2  .08.
Further analyses showed that like the negative video, the propen-
sity to suggestion-based false memories increased from the 6/7-
year-olds (M  4.98) to the 11/12-year-olds (M  5.55; p  .05),
but this difference fell short of statistical significance. For the
participants who did not receive misinformation, only 6/7-year-
olds (M  5.50) had statistically higher discrimination values than
11/12-year-olds (M  2.42; p  .01).
Second, we found a significant Age  Detail  Valence inter-
action, F(2, 79)  8.51, p  .001, p2  .18. For the neutral video,
results yielded a significant Age  Detail interaction, F(2, 79) 
5.19, p .008, p2 .12. Here, additional analyses showed that for
the central details, 6/7-year-olds (M 7.75, SD 4.36) and adults
(M  4.71, SD  4.95) differed significantly in their d= values
(p  .04). Older children (M  5.40, SD  3.79) did not differ
statistically from the other groups (ps  .05). For the peripheral
details, there were no statistically significant differences (p 
1.00).
For the negative video, we found a statistically significant
Age Detail interaction, F(2, 79) 3.61, p .03, p2  .08, with
simple effects tests showing that d= values for the peripheral details
were higher than d= values for the central aspects for younger
(peripheral: M 7.52, SD 5.25; central: M 2.16, SD 3.22);
F(1, 21)  31.17, p  .001, p2  .60, and older children (periph-
eral: M  5.95, SD  4.23; central: M  2.49; SD  4.49); F(1,
28)  13,05, p  .001, p2  .32, but there were no significant
differences for adults, F(1, 30)  1.74, p  .20, p2  .06.
Bias. Our analysis found a significant Valence  Age 
Misinformation interaction, F(2, 79)  6.76, p  .002, p2  0.15.
When we performed additional tests, we found the following. For
the negative video, we found a significant Age  Misinformation,
F(2, 79)  6.24, p  .004, p2  0.14. When misinformation was
provided, 6/7-year-olds (M4.72) had statistically lower liberal
bias scores than the 11/12-year-olds (M  0.60, p  .02) while
the reverse was true when no misinformation was given. Here,
6/7-year-olds (M  0.48) were more conservative than adults
(M  3.12, p  .01).
For the neutral video, we found a main effect of misinformation,
F(1, 79)  5.69, p  .02, p2  0.07, in which the presentation of
misinformation led to more liberal bias values (M  2.97) than
when no misinformation was introduced (M  1.24). All other
effects were not statistically significant (see also Table 4).
False alarms for related and unrelated nonpresented items.
Memory discrimination. We also executed analyses on the d=
values of the nonpresented related items. We found an Age 
Valence interaction, F(2, 78)  3.71, p  .03, p2  0.09.
Follow-up tests revealed that for the neutral video, adults
(M  1.64) did not differ in their discrimination values from
11/12-year-olds (M  2.10) and 6/7-year-olds (M  1.10)
while the two child groups did differ (p  .03). For the negative
video, discrimination values did differ between adults
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Raw Hits, and False Alarms to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented Related Items
as a Function of Age, Type of Detail, and Valence (Experiment 1)
6/7-year-olds 11/12-year-olds Adults
Misinformation Control Misinformation Control Misinformation Control
Central Periph Central Periph Central Periph Central Periph Central Periph Central Periph
Hits
Neutral .63 (.16) .46 (.20) .60 (.22) .41 (.18) .77 (.11) .73 (.12) .77 (.12) .74 (.14) .72 (.15) .73 (.13) .71 (.18) .70 (.17)
Negative .63 (.27) .56 (.22) .67 (.26) .64 (.14) .86 (.11) .72 (.17) .84 (.15) .78 (.14) .79 (.13) .73 (.13) .78 (.14) .73 (.17)
CL
Neutral .70 (.33) .30 (.30) .79 (.34) .27 (.25) .80 (.21) .58 (.24) .65 (.15) .29 (.33) .46 (.38) .29 (.11) .49 (.24) .25 (.15)
Negative .12 (.17) .58 (.34) .42 (.25) .83 (.22) .46 (.32) .74 (.24) .37 (.20) .69 (.28) .48 (.39) .56 (.27) .33 (.27) .46 (.34)
Related
Neutral .00 (.00) .17 (.22) .00 (.00) .06 (.13) .00 (.00) .09 (.15) .00 (.00) .09 (.20) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
Negative .03 (.10) .18 (.23) .19 (.26) .05 (.13) .08 (.14) .13 (.22) .04 (.11) .04 (.11) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
Unrel .02 (.03) .02 (.02) .05 (.06) .03 (.04) .01 (.03) .02 (.02)
Note. CL  critical lures; Periph  peripheral; Unrel  unrelated.
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(M  0.78) and 6/7-year-olds (M  0.31; p  .03), but not for
11/12-year-olds (M  1.04; p  1.00).
Bias. For the bias scores, we only found an age effect, F(2,
78)  8.08, p  .001, p2  0.17, with adults (M  6.50)
differing statistically between 6/7-year-olds (M  4.97) and
11/12-year-olds (M  5.44; p  .004) while the latter two did
not differ (p  1.00).
When we focused on the raw scores of the unrelated items, we
found that the older children had statistically higher unrelated
scores than the adults, F(2, 82)  4.01, p  .02, p2  .09.
DRM task.
Hit rates.
Memory discrimination. We also examined how participants
performed on the DRM paradigm. A 3 (Age: 6/7-year-olds vs.
11/12-year-olds vs. adults)  2 (Valence: negative vs. neutral)
repeated measures ANOVA on the transformed DRM hits yielded
a statistically significant age effect, F(2, 82)  9.83, p  .001,
p2  .19. Post hoc analyses showed that for both types of lists,
adults (M  3.49) had statistically higher discrimination values
than 11/12- (M  1.40) and 6/7-year-olds (M  1.32; p  .001).
The two child groups did not statistically differ (p  1.00). All
other effects were not statistically significant (see Table 6).
Bias. No statistical effects emerged (all ps  .05; Table 7).
False memory.
Memory discrimination. An analysis of the discrimination val-
ues of the critical nonpresented items showed a significant Age 
Valence interaction, F(2, 82) 6.87, p .002, p2  .14. Additional
analyses revealed the following. First, for both types of lists, false
memories increased with age, with adults and 11/12-year-olds having
higher discrimination values than the youngest age group (ps  .05).
Adults and 11/12-year-olds also differed in their level of false mem-
ory susceptibility (p  .04). Second, we found that negative false
memories were more likely to be produced in 6/7- and 11/12-year-
olds relative to neutral false memories (ps  .01). For adults, this
difference was not significant (p  .34; Table 6)
Bias. A statistical Age  Valence interaction was found, F(2,
82)  6.87, p  .002, p2  .14. Simple effects showed that bias
scores for negative false memories were less liberal in 6/7- and
11/12-year-olds relative to bias scores for neutral false memories
(ps  .01). For adults, this difference was not significant (p  .34;
Table 7).
False alarms for related and unrelated nonpresented items.
Memory discrimination. Analyses of the nonpresented related
items revealed a significant valence effect, F(1, 82)  31.21, p 
.001, p2  .28, with higher discrimination values for the negative
related items than for the neutral related items. All other effects
were not statistically significant.
Bias. A significant age effect was observed, F(2, 82)  7.48,
p  .001, p2  .15, with post hoc tests showing that only adults
(M  5.48) had statistically more liberal bias scores than the
11/12-year-olds (M  2.45; p  .001). We also found a valence
effect, F(1, 82) 25.61, p .001, p2 .23, with more liberal bias
scores for the neutral than the negative related items. The interac-
tion was not significant.
When we analyzed the unrelated items, we found that the older
children (M  0.23, SD  0.16) had statistically higher unrelated
scores than the adults (M  0.09, SD  0.08); F(2, 82)  7.07,
p  .001, p2  .15.
Misinformation-DRM correlational analyses. Finally, we
were interested in whether DRM false memories would be
related to suggestion-based false memories. The correlations in
all experiments were computed on discrimination scores. Inter-
estingly, a partial correlational analysis in which we looked at
four correlations (correlations between DRM and video false
memories) and in which we controlled for age found that
neutral DRM false memories were statistically related to neutral
and negative suggestion-induced false memories, respectively
(r  .24, p  .03; r  .38, p  .001). Likewise, we found that
negative DRM false memories were statistically related to neu-
tral and negative suggestion-induced false memories (r  .24,
p  .03; r  .23, p  .04).
Discussion
The results of this experiment showed that developmental re-
versals do exist in suggestion-based false memories. Specifically,
when certain theoretically prescribed conditions pertain (i.e., when
Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of d= Values for DRM Hits, and False Alarms
to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented Related Items as a Function of Age and Valence
(Experiment 1)
6/7-year-olds 11/12-year-olds Adults
Neutral Negative Neutral Negative Neutral Negative
Hits 1.06 (1.64) 1.55 (1.66) 1.38 (1.61) 1.62 (1.62) 3.54 (3.15) 3.44 (2.59)
CL .04 (2.67) 1.77 (2.92) 1.66 (1.86) 3.84 (3.29) 4.80 (3.56) 4.20 (3.85)
Related 2.69 (4.11) 1.24 (2.72) 1.78 (3.32) .37 (2.28) 2.97 (3.13) .02 (3.84)
Note. DRM  Deese/Roediger-McDermott; CL  critical lures.
Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Raw DRM
Hits, and False Alarms to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented
Related Items as a Function of Age and Valence (Experiment 1)
6/7-year-olds 11/12-year-olds Adults
Neutral Negative Neutral Negative Neutral Negative
Hits .35 (.21) .52 (.24) .58 (.18) .66 (.15) .75 (.11) .75 (.17)
CL .30 (.29) .51 (.31) .61 (.23) .79 (.21) .69 (.27) .67 (.25)
Related .15 (.26) .23 (.26) .19 (.18) .35 (.20) .06 (.12) .18 (.15)
Unrel .18 (.20) .23 (.16) .09 (.08)
Note. DRM Deese/Roediger-McDermott; CL critical lures; Unrel
unrelated.
40 OTGAAR, HOWE, BRACKMANN, AND SMEETS
critical items in a misinformation paradigm are semantically re-
lated to the presented items during the study phase), suggestion-
induced false memories increased with age. That is, we found that
memory discrimination increased with age, a clear developmental
reversal effect. This pattern was most evident for the negative
suggestion-based false memories. Although suggestion-based false
memories for neutral videos also increased with age, this increase
fell short of significance. Thus, like the spontaneous DRM-based
false memories in this experiment, suggestion-based false memo-
ries were more likely in older children and adults than in younger
children.
In the current design, we ensured that during the study phase,
participants encountered details that were associatively related to
nonpresented critical items. Then, during the misinformation
phase, misinformation was presented about these nonpresented
critical items. When participants subsequently received a recogni-
tion task, older children and adults were more likely to associa-
tively relate these critical items with the originally presented items
in the videos than the younger children. This resulted in a devel-
opmental reversal of the usual trend in suggestibility research, one
that showed that older children and adults were more likely to
develop suggestion-based false memories than younger children.
For both the negative and neutral videos, however, we did not
find that this reversal continued into adulthood. Specifically, in the
negative video, we found no differences between 11/12-year-olds’
and adults’ false memory levels and for the neutral video we found
that adults’ false memory levels were lower than the 11/12-year-
olds’ false memory rates. For the negative video, our findings are
in line with our DRM findings in that older children and adults did
not differ in their false memory propensity. A possible reason for
not finding a difference between 11/12-year-olds and adults is that
children of this age activate related concepts in as rapid and
automatic a manner as adults.
As mentioned, for the neutral video, we found that adults’ false
memory rates were reduced compared to 11/12-year-olds’
false memory rates. There are other studies showing that adults’
false memory rates can be lower than children’s (Otgaar et al.,
2012; Wimmer & Howe, 2010). Although speculative, researchers
have noted that these age discrepancies in false memory formation
might be tied to individual and population variations in false
memory vulnerability (Bouwmeester & Verkoeijen, 2010). De-
spite these discrepancies, we still found that under circumstances
that primarily rely on gist extraction (FTT) or associative activa-
tion (AAT), both spontaneous and suggestion-based false memo-
ries follow a positive monotonic trajectory between younger and
older children.
Also, at a descriptive level, neutral false memory rates were
slightly higher than negative false memories in young children. So,
although all participants perceived the negative video as statisti-
cally more negative than the neutral one, this did not translate in
statistically higher false memory rates for the negative video as
what would be expected (Howe et al., 2010). One possibility is that
associative networks for these videos differed between age group
and that younger children had a more extensive knowledge base
for the neutral than the negative video. Therefore, additional
studies should examine whether participants’ knowledge base
might vary between different types of emotional material.
However, although our DRM lists were specifically constructed
to differ with regard to valence, our videos could have differed in
terms of arousal. This is important because we know that arousal
also drives changes in false memory rates (e.g., Brainerd et al.,
2011). There are also other dimensions that might have differed
between our videos (e.g., relatedness, familiarity) that could have
potentially affected our results. It is therefore relevant to urge
caution when interpreting our emotional false memory effects. To
circumvent this issue, for our next second experiment, we opted to
include only the negative video.
Interestingly, we found that both negative and neutral DRM
false memories were positively related to the development of both
negative and neutral suggestion-based false memories. This im-
plies that similar processes, such as associative activation, are
involved in developmental trends in both domains. Up until now,
developmental studies linking DRM false memories with false
memories for more complex realistic events have not been con-
ducted (see Brainerd et al., 2008). Although there are studies that
have found positive correlations between DRM false memories
and false memories for autobiographical events in children and
adults (e.g., Otgaar et al., 2012), these studies are somewhat
limited. Our study presents a hitherto unreported finding suggest-
ing that whatever the type of false memory (e.g., spontaneous or
suggestion-induced) similar endogenous processes seem to play a
role in developmental patterns of these false memories.
We also explored whether our effects might interact with the
type of detail (peripheral vs. central). The reason behind this is
that for emotional events particularly, central details are better
remembered than peripheral details (Thijssen, Otgaar, Meijer,
Smeets, & de Ruiter, 2012). However, in our experiment,
developmental reversal effects were observed for both types of
detail thereby demonstrating the robustness of this developmen-
tal reversal effect.
Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of C Values for DRM hits, and False Alarms
to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented Related Items as a Function of Age and Valence
(Experiment 1)
6/7-year-olds 11/12-year-olds Adults
Neutral Negative Neutral Negative Neutral Negative
Hits 1.40 (2.45) .89 (2.53) .37 (1.09) .13 (1.03) .47 (1.47) .57 (.147)
CL 1.97 (4.74) .16 (4.54) .08 (1.78) 2.10 (3.41) .79 (3.70) .19 (3.67)
Related 4.62 (5.06) 3.71 (4.24) 3.52 (3.43) 1.38 (2.03) 6.98 (3.29) 3.98 (3.35)
Note. DRM  Deese/Roediger-McDermott; CL  critical lures.
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Experiment 2
Because the results of Experiment 1 provide novel yet tentative
evidence showing developmental reversals in suggestion-induced
false memories with meaning-connected stimuli, we attempted to
replicate these results in a new sample using a more straightfor-
ward procedure. To begin, because adults did not differ signifi-
cantly from older children in terms of false memory propensity, we
only included children in Experiment 2 and added an extra group
of younger 4- to 6-year-olds. Because this latter group has often
been found to be highly vulnerable to suggestive influences (Ceci
& Bruck, 1993), it was important to see whether developmental
reversals occurred at this younger age. Second, because our de-
velopmental effects seemed to be more pronounced for the nega-
tive than neutral video, we only used the negative video in this
experiment. Third, because we obtained significant developmental
reversals in the misinformation condition (as predicted), we elim-
inated the control condition in which no misinformation was
presented.
Method
Participants
Seventy participants were involved in this experiment (4/6-year-
olds: n  18, mean age  4.83, SD  0.44, range 4–6; 7/9-year-
olds: n  21, mean age  7.33, SD  0.78, range 7–9; 10/12-
year-olds: n  31, mean age  10.81, SD  0.65, range 10–12).
A power analysis with a power of 0.80 and a medium effect size
(partial2  0.13) resulted in a sample size of 69. Data collection was
terminated after 70 children received consent to participate. We
tested an extra participant in case children dropped out of the
experiment. The goal was to test equal numbers of children in each
age group, but the number of children was based on obtaining
parental consent (and hence we had an unequal number of children
in the groups). We stopped data collection when our total desired
sample size was met. Children’s parents had provided consent for
their child’s participation in the study and all children assented on
the day of participation. All children received a small present for
their participation. The study was approved by the standing ethical
committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience at
Maastricht University.
Design
The current experiment made use of a 3 (Age: 4/6-year-olds vs.
7/9-year-olds vs. 10/12-year-olds)  2 (Detail: central vs. periph-
eral) split-plot design with the latter factor being within partici-
pant.
Materials
We used the exact same negative video, misinformation (nega-
tive), DRM lists, and DRM recognition task as in Experiment 1.
The only exception was the recognition task for the video.
Our recognition task was also audio taped and consisted of 24
correct items, six critical items, six nonpresented related items, and
24 nonpresented unrelated items. Items on the recognition task
were presented at a 5-s rate. Responses were recorded by the
experimenter.
Procedure
Children were tested individually in rooms at their primary
school. They received either the video (misinformation paradigm)
or the DRM word lists (DRM paradigm) first. We counterbalanced
the order of the presentation of the stimuli within each paradigm.
A similar procedure was used as in Experiment 1 except that all
participants received misinformation about the video.
Results
As in Experiment 1, all scores on the video and DRM procedure
were transformed using memory discrimination (d=) and response
bias (c). All data ([un]corrected video and DRM Tasks) are re-
ported in Tables 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 (video and DRM tasks).
Video task.
Hit rates.
Memory discrimination. When we performed a 3 (Age: 4/6-
year-olds vs. 7/9-year-olds vs. 10/12-year-olds)  2 (Detail: cen-
tral vs. peripheral) repeated measures ANOVA, we found no
significant interaction, F(2, 66)  1.14, p  .87, p2  .004, no
significant effect for detail, F(1, 66) 0.01, p .92, p2 .00, but
there was a significant age effect, F(2, 66)  6.34, p  .003, p2 
.16. Post hoc tests revealed that the only 10/12-year-olds (M 
7.73) had statistically higher memory discrimination rates relative
to the youngest child group (M  5.29; p  .004; Table 9)
Bias. No statistical effects emerged when performed analyses
on the response bias scores (all ps  .05; Table 10).
False memory.
Memory discrimination. An analysis of the false memory
rates did not reveal a significant interaction, F(2, 66)  1.42, p 
.25, p2  .04, but we did find a statistically significant age effect,
F(2, 66) 7.61, p .001, p2 .19. As in Experiment 1, we found
a developmental reversal effect. That is, 10/12-year-olds (M 
6.94) and 7/9-year-olds (M  6.16) had statistically higher mem-
ory discrimination values than the 4/6-year-olds (M  3.50; ps 
.05). Results also demonstrated a significant main effect of detail,
F(1, 66)  14.26, p  .001, p2  .18, with discrimination values
being higher for peripheral false items than for central false items
(see Table 9).
Bias. When we performed an analysis on the response bias
scores, we only found a statistically reliable detail effect, F(1,
Table 8
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Raw Hits,
and False Alarms to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented Related
Items as a Function of Age and Valence (Experiment 2)
4/6-year-olds 7/9-year-olds 10/12-year-olds
Central Peripheral Central Peripheral Central Peripheral
Hits .56 (.23) .62 (.22) .74 (.17) .71 (.18) .81 (.12) .82 (.13)
CL .30 (.32) .57 (.38) .62 (.29) .72 (.27) .57 (.31) .74 (.29)
Related .11 (.23) .13 (.26) .17 (.17) .17 (.28) .13 (.19) .19 (.24)
Unrel .03 (.05) .05 (.12) .01 (.02)
Note. CL  critical lures; Unrel  unrelated.
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66) 12.73, p .001, p2 .16, with bias values being less liberal
for peripheral than central false items. All other effects were not
statistically significant (see Table 10).
False alarms for related and unrelated nonpresented items.
When we conducted our analyses for nonpresented (un)related
items, no statistically significant effects emerged.
DRM task.
Hit rates.
Memory discrimination. A repeated measures ANOVA on the
discrimination values of the hit rates revealed a statistically sig-
nificant effect of valence, F(1, 66)  9.76, p  .003, p2  .13.
Specifically, discrimination values were higher for the negative
than neutral presented items. All other effects were not statistically
significant (see Table 12).
Bias. Again, we only found a statistically significant valence
effect, F(1, 66)  8.75, p  .004, p2  .12, with less liberal bias
scores for the negative than neutral presented items (see Table 13).
False memory.
Memory discrimination. We also performed an analysis on
the discrimination values of the false memory rates. We found no
significant interaction, F(2, 66)  1.19, p  .31, p2  .04, but we
did find a developmental reversal effect, F(2, 66)  8.33, p 
.001, p2  .20. Post hoc analyses showed that the 10/12-year-olds
(M  3.93) had significantly higher false memory rates than the
7/9-year-olds (M  1.87; p  .02) and the 4/6-year-olds (M 
1.07; p  .001). The 7/9-year-olds and 4/6-year-olds did not differ
statistically in terms of false memory propensity (p  1.00). We
also found that negative false memories had higher bias scores
than neutral false memories, F(1, 66) 11.64, p .001, p2 .15;
Table 12.
Bias. When we focused our analysis on the bias scores, we
found that 10/12-year-olds (M  3.14) had statistically more
conservative bias scores than the 7/9- (M  .62; p  .002) and
4/6-year-olds (M  .08; p  .001); F(2, 66)  11.03, p  .001,
p2  .25. Furthermore, we found that bias scores were more
conservative for the negative than neutral critical items, F(1, 66)
32.79, p  .001, p2  .33; Table 13.
False alarms for related and unrelated nonpresented items.
Memory discrimination. An analysis of the d= values of the
nonpresented related items revealed no significant interaction, F(2,
66)  1.32, p  .27, p2  .04. We did find that negative related
items had higher discrimination scores than neutral related items,
F(1, 66)  5.80, p  .02, p2  .08. No age effect was detected,
F(2, 66)  0.12, p  .89, p2  .004.
Bias. We only found that negative related items had lower
liberal bias scores than neutral related items, F(1, 66)  6.02, p 
.02, p2  .08.
No statistical effects emerged for the unrelated items, F(2,
66)  .65, p  .52, p2  .02.
Misinformation-DRM correlational analyses. We were also
interested in whether suggestion-based false memories were asso-
ciated with the DRM illusion. When performing four partial cor-
relational analyses controlling for age, we found that negative, r
.32, p .001, DRM false memories were statistically related to the
central suggestion-based false memories.
Discussion
The primary goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate the findings
from Experiment 1 with younger children. That is, we wanted to
show that suggestion-based false memories increased with age
when there was an emphasis on associatively related meaning-
based processing. This experiment showed convincingly that this
developmental reversal did occur with very young children when
using a video-misinformation experiment. Indeed, again, we found
that memory discrimination scores increased with age and the
same pattern was evident for the untransformed scores. Together
with Experiment 1, our results demonstrate that when suggestion-
Table 9
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of d= Values for Hits, and False Alarms to Critical
Lures, and Nonpresented Related Items as a Function of Age and Valence (Experiment 2)
4/6-year-olds 7/9-year-olds 10/12-year-olds
Central Peripheral Central Peripheral Central Peripheral
Hits 5.35 (2.55) 5.23 (2.61) 6.02 (2.84) 6.20 (2.65) 7.80 (2.85) 7.65 (2.61)
CL 1.89 (4.06) 5.10 (3.63) 5.62 (3.00) 6.71 (3.21) 6.19 (3.99) 7.68 (3.72)
Related .61 (.3.11) .08 (4.63) 1.29 (3.03) .72 (3.26) 1.52 (4.00) 2.61 (3.95)
Note. CL  critical lures.
Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of C Values for Hits, and False Alarms to Critical
Lures, and Nonpresented Related Items as a Function of Age and Valence (Experiment 2)
4/6-year-olds 7/9-year-olds 10/12-year-olds
Central Peripheral Central Peripheral Central Peripheral
Hits 1.51 (2.96) 1.68 (2.18) 1.52 (2.32) 1.34 (2.97) 1.47 (2.41) 1.62 (2.21)
CL 3.73 (5.16) .85 (5.87) 1.27 (3.55) .34 (4.06) 2.24 (3.08) .24 (4.37)
Related 6.73 (5.74) 6.05 (6.04) 6.25 (4.31) 6.82 (5.12) 7.76 (3.28) 6.67 (4.18)
Note. CL  critical lures.
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based false memories rely on spreading activation among associ-
atively related concepts (and themes) that developmental reversals
occur in a manner similar to that found for children’s spontaneous
false memories.
Of course, one might argue that our findings are limited inas-
much as we used the same materials in both of our experiments. In
order to demonstrate that our findings are not confined to these
materials and that they can be replicated using other video-
material, we conducted two additional experiments. Because our
findings suggest that negative stimuli resulted in stronger devel-
opmental reversals than neutral material, we decided to only use a
new negative video, one that is also relevant in forensic settings.
Again, we had to pilot this new material using a situational gist
task. We also explored whether the presentation of different types
of misinformation affected the developmental reversal effect. That
is, in Experiments 3 and 4, we not only presented misinformation
in the form of eyewitness testimony as in our previous experi-
ments, but for half of the participants we also presented the same
misinformation during a suggestive interview. We did this because
previous studies have found that children are more susceptible to
misinformation than adults if it is delivered by authority figures
(e.g., adults), particularly in an interview setting (see Ceci &
Bruck, 1993).
Thus, in these final two experiments, participants could receive
one of two versions of misinformation. As before, half of the
participants were presented with misinformation in the form of
another person’s eyewitness testimony. Recall that this minimizes
the impact of direct social influences on false memory formation
(i.e., there is no authority asking suggestive questions) and hence,
we anticipated developmental reversals in this group. In the other
group, the exact same misinformation was presented but in the
form of an interview with the participants. Here, because partici-
pants were confronted with misinformation in a social context, one
might not expect developmental reversals. This is because such a
context includes suggestive pressure by an authority, something
that might lead to the standard developmental trends in suggestion-
induced false memories (i.e., an age-related decrease in false
memories).
Experiment 3
For this experiment, a pilot study was conducted to develop new
material. Participants received critical cue words (e.g., pistol,
money) and they had to come up with related response items to
these words. Like Experiment 1, we used adult undergraduates
from the psychology faculty of Maastricht University in this pilot
study because, as mentioned, previous research has shown that
even if materials are normed specifically for children, develop-
mental patterns of false memory formation are still quite robust
(e.g., Metzger et al., 2008). The response items produced by adults
were then used to construct a video of a bank robbery in which the
critical cue words were not included in the video.
For this pilot task, we again used a situational gist task where
participants had to provide as many related response items as they
could to each of a number of critical cue words in a single context,
namely, a bank robbery. These related response items were then
used for the construction of the video. There were 38 participants
(mean age 28, SD 3.56; 20 male) who each received a booklet
in which 10 critical cue words were mentioned (e.g., pistol, money,
laptop). For the entire task, they were given 15 min to produce as
many related items as they could. The exact instruction for the
bank robbery scene was: “A bank is being robbed by an armed
man. Try to come up with as many items (minimum of 5) that are
related to this event.”
The participants collectively produced many related response
items (N 1,773). Of the 10 critical cue words, five were selected
for which participants produced the most related response items
(i.e., pistol, money, laptop, brochures, numberticket-dispensor).
For each of the five critical cue words we selected the five related
items that were produced most often by participants. For example,
for the critical cue word pistol, participants most often mentioned
the following related response items: loud noise, criminal, bullets,
black clothing, and balaclava. These related response items were
included in the eventual video of the bank robbery and the critical
cue words were left out of the video. Central critical cue words that
were used as misinformation were pistol and money and peripheral
cue words were laptop, brochures, numberticket-dispensor. This
Table 11
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Raw DRM
Hits, and False Alarms to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented
Related Items as a Function of Age and Valence (Experiment 2)
4/6-year-olds 7/9-year-olds 10/12-year-olds
Neutral Negative Neutral Negative Neutral Negative
Hits .50 (.26) .56 (.25) .53 (.24) .56 (.16) .56 (.20) .68 (.16)
CL .41 (.32) .52 (.31) .40 (.29) .64 (.24) .63 (.30) .86 (.17)
Related .23 (.28) .26 (.30) .16 (.18) .23 (.23) .15 (.18) .29 (.22)
Unrel .28 (.26) .23 (.22) .21 (.14)
Note. DRM Deese/Roediger-McDermott; CL critical lures; Unrel
unrelated.
Table 12
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of d= Values for DRM Hits, and False Alarms
to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented Related Items as a Function of Age and Valence
(Experiment 2)
4/6-year-olds 7/9-year-olds 10/12-year-olds
Neutral Negative Neutral Negative Neutral Negative
Hits 1.32 (1.89) 1.54 (1.90) 1.75 (2.26) 1.86 (2.35) 1.23 (1.48) 1.58 (1.31)
CL .76 (2.52) 1.39 (3.09) .84 (3.25) 2.91 (2.92) 2.70 (3.64) 5.17 (3.52)
Related 1.63 (3.31) 1.50 (3.44) 2.09 (3.63) .77 (3.61) 2.81 (3.34) .80 (3.22)
Note. DRM  Deese/Roediger-McDermott; CL  critical lures.
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video was then used as part of a misinformation paradigm in which
we examined whether this new material would change the usual
developmental trend in suggestion-induced false memories and
whether it would lead to the same developmental reversals in
suggestion-based false memories as our first two experiments.
Method
Participants. In this study, 44 7/8-year-olds (mean age 
7.16, SD  0.37; range 7–8; 23 boys) and 42 adult participants
(mean age  20.79, SD  2.60; range 18–28; six men) were
involved. A power analysis with a power of 0.80 and a medium
effect size (partial2  0.13) resulted in a sample size of 84 (Faul et
al., 2007). As 44 children received parental consent to participate,
we stopped with data collection after testing a total of 86 partici-
pants. These age groups were selected because they differ signif-
icantly in terms of false memory propensity (Brainerd et al., 2008).
Children were recruited from elementary schools and could only
participate if they received parental consent and assented on the
day of testing. Children received a small present for their involve-
ment. Adults were undergraduates from the Faculty of Psychology
and Neuroscience and the Faculty of Health, Medicine, and Life
Sciences. They received a monetary award (7.50 euro) or course
credits for their participation. The study was approved by the
standing ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology and
Neuroscience at Maastricht University.
Materials.
Misinformation. Misinformation was presented in two forms:
as an eyewitness account or in an interview. The eyewitness
account was audiotaped and played back to the participants. The
eyewitness mentioned the five critical items and 20 old items from
the original video that were related to the critical items (for each
critical item, four related items were presented from the original
video). In the other version, participants were subjected to a short
interview in which they were asked 25 questions. Five questions
contained misinformation including the not-presented critical
items (e.g., “What was the color of the pistol of the bank robber?”).
The other 20 questions pertained to old items that were presented
during the video (e.g., “Was the color of the balaclava the same as
his jacket?”). Participants were asked to respond to each question
and had to guess if they did not know the answer.
Recognition task for the video. The 50-item recognition task
consisted of five critical items, 20 presented items (four presented
for each critical item), five related but not-presented items (one for
each critical item), and 20 unrelated but not-presented items. Items
on the recognition task were presented at a 5-s rate. Responses
were recorded by the experimenter.
DRM lists. Participants heard five negative DRM word lists
each containing 10 words. These were the same negative DRM
lists as in Experiments 1 and 2. The words were related to critical
lures that were the nonpresented items (e.g., death, punishment).
These lists have proven to effectively elicit spontaneous false
memories (Howe et al., 2010; Otgaar et al., 2010).
Recognition task for the DRM lists. The 45-item recognition
task consisted of five critical lures, 20 presented items (four from
each list), five related but not-presented items (one for each critical
lure), and 15 unrelated but not-presented items. The recognition
task was presented at a 5-s rate for each item. Responses were
recorded by the experimenter.
Design and procedure. We used a 2 (Age: 7/8-year-olds vs.
adults)  2 (Condition: eyewitness account vs. interview)  2
(Detail: central vs. peripheral) mixed design with the latter factor
being within participant. Participants were randomly assigned to
the conditions (eyewitness account: 21 children and 21 adults;
interview: 23 children and 21 adults).
Children were tested in quiet rooms at their schools and adults’
test sessions took place in lab rooms at the university. Participants
were told that they would witness a video and that certain ques-
tions were going to be asked about the video. Participants then had
to look at the video. After this, a 2-min filler task (underline the
letters R and P on a piece of text) was presented to participants.
Next, participants received misinformation in the form of an eye-
witness account or a suggestive interview. One day later, partici-
pants received the recognition test for the video. This final stage
happened after a day in which participants’ memory was tested for
the event because misinformation effects are stronger after a delay
(Higham, 1998). Following this, participants studied five DRM
lists, were given a 2-min filler task, and were then given the DRM
recognition task.
Results
Video task.
Hit rates.
Memory discrimination. Data were transformed as in the pre-
vious experiments. All data are reported in Tables 14, 15, 16, 17,
18, and 19 (video and DRM tasks). A 2 (Age: 7/8-year-olds vs.
adults)  2 (Condition: eyewitness account vs. interview)  2
(Detail: central vs. peripheral) ANOVA was conducted on the
corrected hit rates. A statistically significant three-way interaction
Table 13
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of C Values for DRM Hits, and False Alarms
to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented Related Items as a Function of Age and Valence
(Experiment 2)
4/6-year-olds 7/9-year-olds 10/12-year-olds
Neutral Negative Neutral Negative Neutral Negative
Hits .68 (1.70) .50 (.166) .77 (1.62) .66 (1.39) .35 (.72) .00 (.76)
CL 1.23 (4.72) 1.39 (3.09) 1.68 (3.75) 2.91 (2.92) 1.11 (3.60) 5.17 (3.52)
Related 3.56 (4.89) 3.36 (4.17) 4.60 (3.84) 3.28 (3.52) 4.40 (3.48) 2.39 (2.88)
Note. DRM  Deese/Roediger-McDermott; CL  critical lures.
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was obtained, F(1, 83)  12.77, p  .001, partial2  .13. Simple
effects analyses revealed that for the interview, a statistically
significant age effect was observed, F(1, 83)  13.63, p  .001,
partial2  .25, for the central items with higher discrimination
values for the adults than children. This effect was absent in the
eyewitness account condition, F(1, 83)  1.50, p  .23, partial2 
.04. For the peripheral items, there was a statistically significant
age effect, F(1, 83)  20.57, p  .001, partial2  .20, with adults
having elevated d= values relative to children (see Table 15).
Bias. For the bias scores, we again found a statistically reliable
three-way interaction, F(1, 83)  13.01, p  .001, partial2  .14.
Follow-up tests showed the following. For the central items, bias
scores were more conservative in children than in adults, but only
in the eyewitness condition, F(1, 42) 4.64, p .04, partial2  .10.
For the interview condition, this was not statistically significant.
For the peripheral items, there was a general statistical age effect,
F(1, 83)  4.24, p  .04, partial2  .05, with children having lower
liberal bias scores than adults (see Table 16).
False memory.
Memory discrimination. When we performed similar analy-
ses on the d= values of the false recognition rates (critical items),
the following results emerged. Here, we found a statistically sig-
nificant Age  Detail interaction, F(1, 83)  6.44, p  .01,
partial2  .07. As expected, our results showed that the standard
developmental trend in suggestion-induced false memories was
significantly altered such that it resulted in a developmental rever-
sal effect when misinformation was introduced. Specifically, sim-
ple effect analyses found the following. For peripheral items, we
found that children were less vulnerable to misinformation than
adults, F(1, 85)  5.63, p  .02; partial2  .06, a finding that
illustrates a developmental reversal effect. For the central items,
the results showed no developmental differences between chil-
dren’s and adults’ false memory propensity, F(1, 83)  1.89, p 
.17, illustrating an attenuation of the usual developmental pattern
in suggestion-induced false memories (see Table 15).
Bias. Our analysis only revealed a statistically significant
Age  Detail interaction significant, F(1, 83)  5.25, p  .03,
partial2  .06. Additional tests found that only for the peripheral
critical items, bias scores were statistically more conservative in
children than in adults, F(1, 83) 4.24, p .04; partial2  .05. This
difference was not statistically significant for the central critical
items, F(1, 85)  0.61, p  .44; partial2  .01l (see Table 16).
False alarms for related and unrelated nonpresented items.
Memory discrimination. We also looked at d= values of re-
lated and unrelated items. We found a statistically significant age
effect, F(1, 83)  5.87, p  .02, partial2  .07, with adults (M 
2.78) having higher discrimination scores than children (M 
1.18). Our analysis also found that discrimination scores were
higher for the central than peripheral related items, F(1, 83) 
18.22, p  .001, partial2  .18.
Bias. Our analysis found statistically lower liberal bias scores
for children (M  4.45) than adults (M  6.26); F(1, 83) 
6.20, p  .02; partial2  .07. Furthermore, lower liberal bias scores
were found for the central than peripheral related items, F(1, 83)
17.02, p  .001; partial2  .17.
For the unrelated items, we found that children had statistically
higher false alarm rates than adults, F(1, 83)  10.54, p  .002,
partial2  .11.
DRM task.
Hit rates.
Memory discrimination. We conducted an ANOVA on the
discrimination scores for the DRM lists. This analysis showed a
statistically significant age effect, F(1, 85)  16.05, p  .001,
partial2  .16, where adults (M  4.42) had higher scores than
Table 14
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Raw Hits,
and False Alarms to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented
(Un)Related Items as a Function of Age (Experiment 3)
7/8-year-olds Adults
Central Peripheral Central Peripheral
Hits .86 (.13) .63 (.21) .89 (.11) .76 (.11)
CL .80 (.34) .70 (.29) .57 (.38) .75 (.27)
Related .42 (.32) .16 (.23) .35 (.34) .16 (.24)
Unrel .04 (.05) .01 (.03)
Note. CL  critical lures; Unrel  unrelated.
Table 15
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of d= Values
for Hits, and False Alarms to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented
Related Items as a Function of Age (Experiment 3)
7/8-year-olds Adults
Central Peripheral Central Peripheral
Hits 6.77 (3.31) 4.46 (2.79) 9.52 (3.86) 6.87 (2.08)
CL 8.19 (4.70) 6.79 (4.10) 7.12 (5.86) 8.80 (3.78)
Related 2.83 (5.10) .48 (3.33) 3.89 (4.73) 1.67 (3.86)
Note. CL  critical lures.
Table 16
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of C Values
Hits, and False Alarms to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented
Related Items as a Function of Age (Experiment 3)
7/8-year-olds Adults
Central Peripheral Central Peripheral
Hits .92 (3.56) 1.36 (2.79) .36 (3.11) 2.29 (1.16)
CL 2.08 (5.52) .98 (4.34) 2.05 (5.29) .36 (4.02)
Related 2.97 (4.78) 5.96 (4.82) 5.02 (5.03) 7.49 (3.58)
Note. CL  critical lures.
Table 17
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Raw DRM
Hits, and False Alarms to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented
(Un)Related Items as a Function of Age (Experiment 3)
7/8-year-olds Adults
Hits .71 (.16) .81 (.13)
CL .66 (.20) .81 (.19)
Related .18 (.16) .21 (.20)
Unrel .16 (.11) .07 (.05)
Note. DRM Deese/Roediger-McDermott; CL critical lures; Unrel
unrelated.
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children (M  2.28); F(1, 85)  5.63, p  .02; partial2  .06 (see
Table 18).
Bias. No statistical effects emerged (see Table 19).
False memory.
Memory discrimination. Analyses of false memories showed
the standard developmental reversal effect, F(1, 85)  25.38, p 
.001, partial2  .23, with adults having higher discrimination scores
than children (see Table 18).
Bias. We found that adults had more conservative bias scores
than children, F(1, 85)  7.39, p  .008; partial2  .08 (Table 19).
False alarms for related and unrelated nonpresented items.
Memory discrimination. For related items, we also found that
adults (M  .43) had higher acceptance rates than children
(M  1.36); F(1, 85)  5.75, p  .02, partial2  .06.
Bias. No statistical effects emerged.
For unrelated items, false alarm rates were statistically higher
for children than adults, F(1, 85)  21.50, p  .001, partial2  .20.
Misinformation-DRM correlational analyses. When we ex-
amined whether video false memories were related to DRM false
memories, three partial correlational analyses (controlling for age)
showed that video false memories for the peripheral items were
statistically related to DRM false memories, r  .29, p  .006.
Discussion
Once again, our findings from Experiment 3 provide clear
evidence that using our meaning-modified misinformation para-
digm results in reversals of the usual developmental trends in
suggestion-induced false memories. That is, when children and
adults were confronted with stimuli containing meaningful, asso-
ciatively related details, and were subsequently presented with
associatively related misinformation (preserving the meaning of
the event) about critical, nonpresented items, children were less
prone to accepting that misinformation than adults, at least for
peripheral information. Although we had no strong predictions
concerning developmental trends for false memories for central
and peripheral items, we did find an attenuation (central items) and
a reversal (peripheral items) of suggestion-induced false memory
development. Specifically, our analysis showed that as expected,
when exposed to misinformation, children were not the most
vulnerable to false memories and were sometimes the least vul-
nerable.
Because developmental reversals in suggestion-induced false
memories represents a relatively new field of scientific inquiry,
we conducted Experiment 4 in an attempt to further replicate
our previous findings (see, e.g., Simons, 2014) as well as see
whether developmental reversals can be produced for both
central and peripheral items. In order to examine this, we tested
a larger age span and now specifically focused on development
trends in false memories in children. That is, we tested 4/5-
year-olds, 7/8-year-olds, and 11/12-year-olds. We did not test
adult participants in this study because false memory forma-
tion is often not different between 11/12-year-olds and adults
(Otgaar et al., 2014).
Experiment 4
Participants
In this experiment, we included 52 4/5-year-olds (mean age 
4.60, SD  0.50; range 4–5; 26 boys), 55 7/8-year-olds (mean
age  7.62, SD  0.50; range: 7–8; 29 boys), and 51 11/12-year-
olds (mean age  11.51, SD  0.51; range: 11–12; 24 boys). A
power analysis resulted in a sample size of 68 participants. All
children had parental consent and received a small present for their
involvement. We received parental and school consent to test 158
children and hence, tested all children. Although equal numbers of
children in each group were desired, consent for child participation
meant in that the numbers of children differed somewhat in each
age group. The study was approved by the standing ethical com-
mittee of the Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience at Maas-
tricht University.
Materials
The exact same materials were used here as in Experiment 3.
Design and Procedure
We used a 3 (Age: 4/5-year-olds, 7/8-year-olds, 11/12-year-
olds)  2 (Condition: eyewitness account vs. interview)  2
(Detail: central vs. peripheral) mixed design with the latter factor
constituting a within-participant variable. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to the different conditions (eyewitness account: 27
4/5-year-olds, 29 7/8-year-olds, 26 11/12-year-olds; interview: 25
4/5-year-olds, 26 7/8-year-olds, 25 11/12-year-olds). A similar
procedure was implemented as in Experiment 3.
Results
Video task.
Hit rates.
Memory discrimination. Data were transformed as in the pre-
vious experiments (see Tables 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 for the
video and DRM data). We conducted a 3 (Age: 4/5-year-olds,
Table 18
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of d= Values for
DRM Hits, and False Alarms to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented
Related Items as a Function of Age (Experiment 3)
7/8-year-olds Adults
Hits 2.28 (1.99) 4.42 (2.94)
CL 2.13 (2.42) 5.69 (4.04)
Related 1.36 (3.02) .43 (3.90)
Note. DRM  Deese/Roediger-McDermott; CL  critical lures.
Table 19
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of C Values for
DRM Hits, and False Alarms to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented
Related Items as a Function of Age (Experiment 3)
7/8-year-olds Adults
Hits .33 (1.42) .19 (2.63)
CL .18 (2.13) 1.47 (3.41)
Related 3.34 (3.84) 3.79 (3.32)
Note. DRM  Deese/Roediger-McDermott; CL  critical lures.
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7/8-year-olds, 11/12-year-olds)  2 (Condition: eyewitness ac-
count vs. interview)  2 (Detail: central vs. peripheral) ANOVA
on hit rates. A statistically significant age effect was detected, F(2,
144)  23.37, p  .001, partial2  .25. Post hoc comparisons
showed that 4/5-year-olds (M  2.72) had statistically lower
discrimination scores than the 7/8- (M 5.97) and 11/12-year-olds
(M 2.72; all ps .001). We also found a significant detail effect
with central items having higher values than peripheral ones, F(1,
144)  46.09, p  .001, partial2  .24. All other effects were not
statistically significant (see Table 21).
Bias. We only found a statistically significant detail effect
with the most conservative bias scores for the central items, F(1,
144)  45.00, p  .001, partial2  .24 (see Table 22).
False memory.
Memory discrimination. No significant three-way interaction
emerged, F(2, 148)  1.06, p  .35, partial2  .01. However, as
predicted, we found a developmental reversal effect. That is, a
statistically significant Age  Detail interaction emerged, F(2,
148) 6.45, p .002; partial2  .08, where simple effects analyses
revealed that for both central and peripheral items, false memories
increased with age—central: F(2, 149)  10.33, p  .001;
partial2  .12; peripheral: F(2, 148) 21.19, p .001; partial2  .22.
However, for central items, 4/5-year-olds and 11/12-year-olds did
not differ in terms of false memory rates (p  .052) although this
effect was significant for 4/5-year-olds and 7/8-year-olds (p 
.001). For the peripheral items, false memories increased with age
with 4/5-year-olds having lower false memory rates than 7/8-year-
olds and 11/12-year-olds (ps .001). All other effects were not
statistically significant (see Table 21).
Bias. For bias scores, the analysis also demonstrated a
significant Age  Detail interaction, F(2, 148)  6.33, p 
.002, partial2  .08. Follow-up tests revealed that for both central
and peripheral critical items, an age effect was observed—
central: F(2, 149)  3.39, p  .04, partial2  .04; peripheral:
F(2, 148)  4.62, p  .01, partial2  .06. However, for central
critical items, post hoc comparisons showed that only the 4/5-
year-olds and 7/8-year-olds differed somewhat in their bias
scores; albeit not significant (p  .054). For peripheral critical
items, 11/12-year-olds had more conservative bias scores than
the youngest age group (p  .01). All other effects were not
significant (see Table 22).
False alarms for related and unrelated nonpresented items.
Memory discrimination. For d= values of the related items, we
only found that 4/5-year-olds (M 1.04) had lower discrimination
values than the 11/12-year-olds (M  1.56; F(2, 145)  3.47, p 
.03; partial2  .05). We also found that central related items were
better recognized than peripheral related items, F(1, 145) 21.15,
p  .001; partial2  .13. All other effects were not significant.
Bias. We found that only the youngest children (M  2.46)
had statistically lower liberal bias scores than the 11/12-year-olds
(M  4.90); F(2, 145)  5.60, p  .005, partial2  .07. Our
analysis also showed that bias scores were less liberal for central
than peripheral related items, F(1, 145)  20.98, p  .001,
partial2  .13. All other effects were not significant.
For the unrelated items, 4/5-year-olds had statistically higher
false alarm rates than 7/8-year-old sand 11/12-year-olds, F(2,
143)  20.79, p  .001; partial2  .23.
DRM task.
Hit rates.
Memory discrimination. A univariate ANOVA was performed
on the d= values of the DRM hit rates. A statistically significant age
effect emerged, F(2, 150)  19.50, p  .001; partial2  .21. Post hoc
tests showed that although 11/12-year-olds (M  3.20) and 7/8-year-
olds (M  2.26) remembered more correct items than 4/5-year-
olds (M  .63; ps  .001), the difference between 7/8-year-olds
and 11/12-year-olds was not significant (p  .07; Table 24).
Bias. A significant age effect was observed, F(2, 150)  9.62,
p .001, partial2  .11, showing that 4/5-year-olds (M 1.48) had
more conservative bias scores than the 7/8- (M  .08) and
11/12-year-olds (M  .34; ps  .002; Table 25).
False memory.
Memory discrimination. For d= values of false memories we
found a statistically significant main effect of age, F(2, 151) 
124.11, p  .001; partial2  .45. Post hoc tests revealed a devel-
opmental reversal effect in that 11/12-year-olds (M  4.56) had
higher false memory rates than 7/8-year-olds (M  2.73) who in
turn had higher false memory levels than 4/5-year-olds (M  .81;
all ps  .05; Table 24).
Table 20
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Raw Hits,
and False Alarms to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented
(Un)Related Items as a Function of Age (Experiment 4)
4/5-year-olds 7/8-year-olds 11/12-year-olds
Central Peripheral Central Peripheral Central Peripheral
Hits .67 (.24) .48 (.29) .87 (.12) .64 (.16) .88 (.11) .80 (.14)
CL .66 (.40) .53 (.39) .88 (.22) .70 (.23) .73 (.36) .82 (.22)
Related .47 (.28) .33 (.37) .43 (.17) .26 (.22) .37 (.22) .17 (.17)
Unrel .23 (.29) .04 (.06) .04 (.05)
Note. CL  critical lures; Unrel  unrelated.
Table 21
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of d= Values for Hits, and False Alarms to
Critical Lures, and Nonpresented Related Items as a Function of Age (Experiment 4)
4/5-year-olds 7/8-year-olds 11/12-year-olds
Central Peripheral Central Peripheral Central Peripheral
Hits 3.41 (3.17) 2.02 (2.76) 7.18 (4.11) 4.77 (2.86) 7.31 (3.72) 6.17 (3.41)
CL 2.83 (3.33) 1.82 (2.41) 5.44 (1.74) 3.81 (1.81) 4.31 (2.76) 4.76 (1.90)
Related 1.97 (4.20) .14 (3.92) 3.46 (4.08) 1.70 (2.92) 2.53 (4.11) .65 (3.96)
Note. CL  critical lures.
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Bias. No age effect was found (see Table 25).
False alarms for related and unrelated nonpresented items.
Memory discrimination. We found that 11/12-year-olds (M 
.85) had higher discrimination values than 7/8-year-olds (M.80);
F(2, 151)  4.27, p  .01, partial2  .05.
Bias. The youngest age group (M  .67) had more conserva-
tive bias scores than the 7/8-year-olds (M  3.14) and 11/12-
year-olds (M2.64); F(2, 151) 13.39, p .001, partial2  .15.
For the unrelated items, we found that the youngest group had
statistically higher false alarm rates than the 7/8-year-olds and
11/12-year-olds, F(2, 151)  43.59, p  .001; partial2  .37.
Misinformation-DRM correlational analyses. Three partial
correlational analyses (controlling for age) revealed that video
false memories for central information were statistically related to
the formation of DRM false memories, r  .19, p  .02.
Discussion
The findings of Experiment 4 again convincingly demonstrate
that false memories in a suggestibility paradigm can increase with
age under circumstances that focus on the meaning of an event. In
this experiment, we even found stronger evidence for a develop-
mental reversal effect inasmuch as reversals were obtained for
both central and peripheral details. Of course, this occurred only
when we included 4/5-year-olds. Moreover, in this study, we found
that for both the interview and eyewitness account, susceptibility
to misinformation increased with age.
In both Experiments 3 and 4, we showed that when using new
material, standard age-related trajectories in suggestion-induced
false memories were attenuated or even reversed. Although we
found in Experiment 3 that this effect was most pronounced for the
peripheral items, in Experiment 4, we found developmental rever-
sal effects for both central and peripheral items, irrespective of
misinformation condition (interview vs. eyewitness statements).
Although we expected that an interview would introduce elements
of social pressure, we did not find that this altered developmental
trends in suggestion-induced false memories.
Cross-Experiment Analysis of Developmental
Reversals
For each experiment, we identified how many developmental
reversal effects for the video and DRM tasks were predicted and
checked how many we found. For Experiment 1 (video task), we
only predicted developmental reversals when misinformation was
provided (n  4; neutral-central, neutral-peripheral, negative-
central, negative-peripheral). We found reversal effects in all four
of them. For the DRM task, we predicted two reversal effects
(neutral and negative) and we also found reversals for both of
them. For Experiment 2 (video task), we expected to find two
reversal effects (central and peripheral) and reversal effects were
found for both. For the DRM task, we expected two reversal
effects (neutral and negative) and two were also detected. For
Experiment 3 (video task), four developmental reversals were
predicted (interview-central, interview-peripheral, eyewitness
account-central, eyewitness account-peripheral), and we found ev-
idence for two reversal effects (interview-central, interview-
peripheral). For the other two, we found attenuation effects. For
the DRM task, we expected one developmental reversal effect and
we found evidence for this prediction. For Experiment 4 (video
task), we expected four reversal effects (see Experiment 3) and we
found evidence for all of them. For the DRM task, one reversal
effect was predicted and this was also found. Taken together, for
the video and DRM tasks, we find developmental reversal effects
in 90% of the cases (18/20). If we only focus on the suggestion-
induced false memories, then we find evidence for reversal effects
in 86% (12/14) of the cases.
Table 22
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of C Values for Hits, and False Alarms to
Critical Lures, and Nonpresented Related Items as a Function of Age (Experiment 4)
4/5-year-olds 7/8-year-olds 11/12-year-olds
Central Peripheral Central Peripheral Central Peripheral
Hits .05 (3.87) 1.30 (4.09) .60 (3.11) 1.81 (1.51) .51 (3.45) .31 (3.01)
CL .76 (6.05) 1.17 (6.40) 3.12 (3.70) .14 (3.96) 1.01 (5.57) 1.72 (4.27)
Related 1.51 (5.04) 3.32 (6.50) 3.12 (2.52) 4.88 (4.25) 3.95 (3.44) 5.83 (3.83)
Note. CL  critical lures.
Table 23
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Raw DRM
Hits, and False Alarms to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented
(Un)Related Items as a Function of Age (Experiment 4)
4/5-year-olds 7/8-year-olds 11/12-year-olds
Hits .68 (.24) .74 (.13) .78 (.14)
CL .64 (.28) .65 (.21) .75 (.24)
Related .54 (.35) .23 (.19) .25 (.15)
Unrel .48 (.33) .16 (.12) .13 (.09)
Note. DRM Deese/Roediger-McDermott; CL critical lures; Unrel
unrelated.
Table 24
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of d= Values
DRM Hits, and False Alarms to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented
Related Items as a Function of Age (Experiment 4)
4/5-year-olds 7/8-year-olds 11/12-year-olds
Hits .63 (1.86) 2.26 (1.88) 3.20 (2.47)
CL .81 (2.90) 2.73 (2.68) 4.55 (3.40)
Related .26 (3.12) .80 (2.74) .85 (2.91)
Note. DRM  Deese/Roediger-McDermott; CL  critical lures.
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General Discussion
Our experiments were designed to answer a simple question:
Does the typical developmental trend in suggestion-induced false
memories (i.e., age-related decline in false memory) change when
(associatively or semantically) related information is used as mis-
information? The answer is yes. Four experiments showed that
under theoretically prescribed conditions (where misinformation is
associatively related to the originally studied information) that
older children and adults were more vulnerable to false memories
than younger children. That is, in contrast to the usual suggest-
ibility effects in childhood, younger children were not more vul-
nerable to false memory production than older children and adults.
Indeed, we even found evidence for a developmental reversal
effect in suggestion-based false memories. That we found similar
results in different age groups (4- to 12-year-olds and adults)
reinforces the argument that under conditions in which people
have to rely on thematic, associative activation, younger children
are not more susceptible to false memories than older children and
adults and are even sometimes the least vulnerable to false mem-
ory formation. Moreover, across the four experiments we used a
number of newly created materials and found evidence for changes
in the typical developmental trend in suggestion-induced false
memories across these materials.
If we look more closely at the analyses of age effects in false
memory across experiments (DRM and misinformation), we find
that 90% (n  18) of these analyses showed clear evidence for
developmental reversals. If we only focus on the misinformation
experiments, 86% (n  12) show developmental reversal effects
(see cross-experiment analysis of developmental reversals). This
clearly shows that our experiments were quite successful in dem-
onstrating that when using meaning-connected material, develop-
mental trends in children’s susceptibility to misinformation and
false memories can be altered and can even be reversed so that
they increase with age. If we compare this with the overview of
studies on developmental false memory effects (see Figure 1a), it
is obvious that our experiments reveal the malleability of
suggestion-based false memory development.
Importantly, we found that our developmental effects in
suggestion-based false memories were found mainly in terms of
false recognition of critical items. Similar developmental trends
were less pronounced in other variables (e.g., related items). This
is in line with previous research on developmental trends in
spontaneous false memories (Brainerd et al., 2008) and reinforces
our argument that our procedure specifically resulted in spreading
activation to critical items and did not spill over onto less related
items. Furthermore, our developmental reversal effects seemed to
go hand in hand with younger children having lower hit rates than
older children and adults, another standard finding in memory
development research (Brainerd et al., 2008).
In Experiments 3 and 4, we also explored whether the presen-
tation of different types of misinformation (social pressure in an
interview format vs. eyewitness testimony) affected developmental
trends in false memory differently. The reasoning behind this was
that external influences such as social pressure might not load on
any endogenous processes (associative activation, gist extraction)
and hence, lead to the standard age-related decrease in suggestion-
based false memories. In Experiments 3 and 4, we found that both
social pressure and eyewitness testimony led to developmental
reversal effects. Of course, this issue warrants further examination,
but it might imply that even social pressure is not a reliable
predictor for causing younger children to assent more to misinfor-
mation than older children and adults.
Links to Theories of Memory Development
Our studies were derived in large measure from the tenets of
AAT (Howe et al., 2009) and it turns out that our findings are
consistent with this theory. Recall that in AAT, false memories
arise out of automatic associative activation in one’s knowledge
base and that false memories increase with age because as one’s
knowledge base expands and is restructured (also see Ceci et al.,
2007), spreading activation becomes more automatic (Howe et al.,
2009). The presentation of associatively related information during
the misinformation phase increased children’s associative activa-
tion resulting in either no differences between children’s and
adults’ false memory rates or a developmental increase in false
memories. Thus, when misinformation included the related non-
presented details, it was the older children (and adults) who were
most likely to associate these details within their knowledge base
and form false memories.
Of course, it is important to acknowledge that other false mem-
ory theories are also able to explain the current findings. For
example, in FTT, developmental reversals in suggestion-induced
false memories would be predicted when gist-related information
was provided during the misinformation phase. Because younger
children were less likely to get the gist from the videos than older
children (and adults), and when misinformation was provided that
included the related nonpresented items, older children (and
adults) were more likely to associate this with the presented details
and developed more false memories than younger children.
Another aim of the present research was to explore whether
valence would interact with developmental trends in suggestion-
induced false memories. That is, the affect-as-information hypoth-
esis (Corson & Verrier, 2007) predicts that negative experiences
do not lead as easily to false memories as positive ones because
people attend more to item-specific details in negative events,
something that lowers false memory production. However, both
AAT and FTT assume that it is easier to extract the underlying
meaning of negative events than more mundane (or positive)
events, because negative events evoke networks of more strongly
interrelated nodes. Information activation is therefore more likely
to spread throughout networks of negative than neutral material,
increasing false memory rates. Indeed, we found that negative
materials led to more false memories than neutral material and that
younger children were less likely to produce false memories than
Table 25
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of C Values DRM
Hits, and False Alarms to Critical Lures, and Nonpresented
Related Items as a Function of Age (Experiment 4)
4/5-year-olds 7/8-year-olds 11/12-year-olds
Hits 1.48 (3.51) .08 (1.01) .34 (1.44)
CL 1.70 (4.37) .39 (2.68) 1.06 (3.94)
Related .67 (5.37) 3.14 (3.48) 2.64 (2.86)
Note. DRM  Deese/Roediger-McDermott; CL  critical lures.
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older children and adults for both the neutral and negative material.
Thus, in line with the work on valence and DRM lists (Howe et al.,
2010), our experiments also revealed that valence does not interact
with developmental trends in suggestion-induced false memories.
However, one should interpret our emotional false memory effects
with caution as it is unclear whether our video material (in Exper-
iment 1) differed in valence, arousal, or on even more dimensions
(e.g., familiarity). Future studies could attempt to replicate the
present findings with stimuli controlling for factors such as va-
lence and arousal.
Finally, our results are related to a developmental-
representational theory that specifies that differences in mental
representations of experiences drive memory development and that
these differences explain reversals in memory development. One
important discovery in this area concerns age improvements in
metamemory (i.e., introspection of the contents of memory). This
research has shown that metamemory abilities protect people from
the acceptance of false information (Ghetti, 2008). Indeed, one
might argue that falsely recognizing the critical lure during the
recognition task could be due to poor source monitoring in that
participants mistakenly recognize the critical lure as being part of
the original event while it was presented as part of the misinfor-
mation. It is true that misinformation effects are often explained in
terms of source misattributions (e.g., Loftus, 2005). However, poor
source monitoring is unable to explain the developmental reversal
effects found in the current experiments. That is, research shows
that younger children have poorer source monitoring abilities than
older children and adults (Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991).
Based on this, one would expect that younger children would be
more vulnerable to misinformation than older children and adults.
Because we found the opposite pattern in our experiments, it is
likely that our results are better explained in terms of developmen-
tal changes in spreading activation, changes in knowledge base, or
the ability to extract gist.
Links to Other Studies of False Memory
One may wonder whether our findings are novel. Developmen-
tal reversals have surfaced in several other memory paradigms
besides the DRM paradigm (Candel, Memon, & Al-Harazi, 2007:
memory conformity; Connolly & Price, 2006: suggestibility; Ceci
et al., 2007: misinformation; Goswick, Mullet, & Marsh, 2013:
stories; Lyons, Ghetti, & Cornoldi, 2010: causal narratives; Ode-
gard, Cooper, Lampinen, Reyna, & Brainerd, 2009: group play;
Otgaar & Smeets, 2010: survival processing; Principe et al., 2008:
rumor-mongering; Ross et al., 2006: eyewitness identification;
Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004: categorized lists; see for an overview,
Brainerd, 2013). For example, Candel, Memon, and Al-Harazi
(2007) showed that in free recall, memory conformity effects were
stronger in 11/12-year-olds than in 6/7-year-olds. Also, Principe,
Guiliano, and Root (2008) found developmental reversal effects in
a paradigm measuring rumor-mongering. Furthermore, Ross et al.
(2006) found that adults made more identifications of an innocent
bystander than children. However, there are several critical dimen-
sions present in the current project that differentiates it from this
previous research, making the present results novel.
First, as seen earlier, research into developmental reversals in
the misinformation paradigm is extremely limited and develop-
mental reversals have not been extensively examined for im-
planted false memories (i.e., misinformation-based false memo-
ries). This is surprising as this paradigm has been at the heart of
studies linking false memories with the legal arena. Indeed, the
misinformation paradigm is frequently regarded as one of the most
important paradigms for studying false memories (Loftus, 2005).
More importantly, none of the studies listed above followed the
recommendations put forward by Brainerd et al. (2011) who sug-
gested that researchers should study developmental reversals in the
misinformation paradigm. That is, Brainerd et al. (2011) argued
that developmental reversals in the misinformation paradigm can
be revealed when children and adults receive material containing
associatively related details that are then presented with misinfor-
mation that preserves the underlying meaning of the event. We are
the first using such a procedure and in line with theories as FTT
and AAT, we find developmental reversal effects for suggestion-
induced false memories. Second, and as has been articulated by
Ceci Papierno, and Kulkofsky (2007) and Brainerd et al. (2011),
the present findings are novel because they have been predicted
from an a priori position and are closely based on theoretical
mechanisms found in both FTT and AAT; something that has not
been done before to the extent we have examined it in this article
(see below).
It is true that our findings are in line with Ceci et al.’s (2007)
study in that these researchers also used an adapted misinformation
paradigm. However, our experiments add new perspectives to this
work. First, we extend Ceci et al.’s (2007) findings as we have
used different and more forensically relevant (videos) materials,
ones that also differed in emotion. Second, we conducted four
misinformation experiments using our adapted protocol and
showed developmental reversals across all of them. Indeed, these
reversals in suggestion-induced false memories are quite robust,
something that has not been demonstrated prior to the research
reported in this article. Third, reversals in suggestion-induced false
memories have not been examined from an a priori perspective.
Indeed, Ceci, Fitneva, and Williams (2010, p. 465) acknowledge
that work in this area is important because “[s]uch reversals, albeit
rare, present a serious challenge to theory, and past accounts of
their occurrence have been post hoc and have not led to a priori
predictions of when younger and older children’s performance will
be similar or reversed.” Finally, in contrast to previous studies, a
novel element of our experiments is that we compared false
memories obtained with our new material with DRM false mem-
ories. In this way, we could check whether mechanisms underlying
DRM false memories (i.e., associative activation) also played a
role in the elicitation of suggestion-induced false memories. As
expected, we found evidence that susceptibility to suggestion-
induced false memory was positively linked to DRM false memory
illusions, independent of age.
The crucial message from the experiments presented here is that
the assumption that children’s testimonial accuracy is necessarily
inferior to that of adults’ is untenable. Indeed, simply by changing
the nature of the materials, we found that older children (and
adults) produced more false memories than younger children.
Thus, we have demonstrated that the validity of such an assump-
tion depends on a number of considerations, ones that derive from
theoretical principles concerning the role of meaning-connected
information in events and how this information interacts with
memory development generally and the formation of false mem-
ories specifically.
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The focus of our article was on an examination of developmen-
tal trajectories of suggestion-induced false memories that were
grounded in semantic activation. Of course, this limits the gener-
alizability of our findings to other false memories that are the
result of external influences such as social pressure or forced
confabulation. Also, one could argue that our findings are silent
about developmental trends in false memories for autobiographi-
cal, real-life experiences. Although this limitation needs to be
taken seriously, there is evidence showing developmental reversal
effects in other eyewitness paradigms such as rumor-mongering
and group conformity (e.g., Candel et al., 2007; Principe et al.,
2008). However, it is still important to be cautious about how far
we can generalize our findings and acknowledge the continuing
debate as to whether memory illusions based on semantic activa-
tion are related to other types of (false) memories (e.g., Gallo,
2010; Ost et al., 2013; Otgaar, Verschuere, Meijer, & Van Oor-
souw, 2012).
Links to Other Domains
Our results have implications for domains other than memory
development. For example, our experiments are in line with the
accumulating body of research in cognitive development that is
also showing that younger children sometimes outperform older
children and adults. Indeed, younger children are better at distin-
guishing foreign sounds than older children and adults (Kuhl,
2004; Werker, Yeung, & Yoshida, 2012). Also, younger children
are superior in coming up with alternative ways to use tools than
older children (Defeyter & German, 2003). Finally, Gopnik, Grif-
fiths, and Lucas (2015) showed that unusual abstract causal prin-
ciples were better learned by younger than older children.
A likely candidate for a common mechanism for these counter-
intuitive developmental patterns is age-related changes in one’s
knowledge base. Indeed, according to Gopnik et al. (2015), ac-
quiring new knowledge might result in being less flexible for new
ideas. Furthermore, they reasoned that although a dense and well-
integrated knowledge base might consist of many interrelated
connections, these connections do not leave room for exploratory
behavior. For the field of memory, our experiments show that such
a dense and well-integrated knowledge base can also be disadvan-
tageous because it gives rise to false recollections.
The implication here is that more focus should be placed on
understanding the role of knowledge base in developmental stud-
ies. There are several specific areas that might benefit from such a
focus. For example, in educational contexts, considerable weight is
placed on learning new material and integrating it with one’s
current knowledge base. In order for this to occur, it would be
useful to know the current status of students’ knowledge in order
to tailor the new material so that it can be easily integrated when
learning takes place (see also Roediger, 2013). Like Gopnik et al.
(2015), it would be relevant to assess whether for certain concepts
and tasks, older children experience more learning difficulties than
younger children.
Another area that might advance from a focus on one’s knowl-
edge base is the forensic context. The lesson from the current
experiments is that a child’s age can no longer be used as a
predictor of their reliability as an eyewitness. Indeed, in many
criminal cases, expert witnesses regularly (falsely) assume that
young children are more apt to produce most kinds of memory
errors, whether they arise spontaneously or due to suggestion-
induced pressures (for a recent case, see Brackmann, Otgaar,
Sauerland, & Jelicic, 2015). However, there are perhaps other
forensic ramifications of our findings. For example, although not
done at present, one interesting possibility might be to examine
whether the DRM paradigm (referring to one’s knowledge base) is
a valid and reliable method of indexing a person’s susceptibility to
form spontaneous false memories in an interrogation setting. Eye-
witnesses, victims, and suspects are occasionally tested on their
vulnerability to suggestive pressure (e.g., Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson,
Bragason, Newton, & Einarsson, 2008), but there is virtually no
empirical knowledge about whether the DRM paradigm could be
a useful tool in an interrogation setting as well (Brainerd et al.,
2011).
Conclusion
To recap, we have shown that when using well-specified theo-
retical principles, developmental trends in false memories can be
manipulated. Although it is frequently the case that misinformation
effects are more pronounced in younger than older children and
adults, we found that developmental trends in these suggestion-
based memory illusions can be reversed. Indeed, across all of the
misinformation experiments reported in this article, susceptibility
to suggestion did not always decrease with age, and that under
certain specific conditions, older children (and adults) were more
prone to suggestion-induced false memories than younger chil-
dren.
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